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This study identifies and analyzes American images of
Arabs. It is a content analysis of nine years of the New
York lim es (1967-1975), which: (1) determines whether the
American image of Arabs is unfavorable, neutral or
favorable, (2) identifies the favorable and unfavorable
images, (3) identifies trends as the images change and as
they apply to specific Arab nations or peoples and (4)
analyzes tnese findings and assesses their importance xn
future pclicy formation.
Data was collected on thirteen Arab nations and the
Palestinians. Statistical techniques of content analysis
were applied to the 2,401 cases examined. Basic conclusions
include: (1) the majority of cases (51.6%) indicates an
unfavorable American image of the Araos; (2) the three most
freguent themes found were that Arabs are terrorists,
factionated and disunited and are militant and belligerent;
(3) over the period there has been a small increase in the
favorable rating and a dramatic decrease in the unfavorable
rating, and; (4) this type of research may be usefully
employed in assessing the feasibility of certain foreign
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INTRODUCTION
Although the study of images and their effect on the
perception of decision-makers in international relations is
not new, there has been little specific attention devoted to
images of Arabs. Those efforts at identifying American
images of Arabs have been either issue or time specific and
have not been sufficiently broad or deep in their scope to
provide one with what the images actually are. (See, for
instance, Suleiman's and Wagner's studies cited below and in
note 21.)
The purpose of this paper is to take an in depth look at
exactly what images Americans have of Araos. The specific
objectives are to:
(1) Determine whether the images of Arabs that are
created by a comprehensive news medium are favorable,
neutral or unfavorable.
(2) Determine what the favorable and unfavorable images
are.
(3) Identify trends as the images change and as they
apply to specific Arab nations or groups of people.
(<4) Be able to analyze these findings and draw





II. IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
PRACTICE
THEORY AND
A. PERCEPTION, BELIEF SYSTEMS AND IMAGES
The starting point in the decision-making process cf any
actor is his perception of reality. This perception, in tne
most general sense, ". . . has something to do with [his]
awareness of the objects or conditions about [him]," 1 and is
dependent on the actor's unconscious inferences. Thus, "Out
of transactions with the environment, a pattern of
unconscious assumptions is built and the total of these
constitute the individual's world. . . " 2 This "world" or
perception of reality, constitutes the actor's belief
system. It is essential to realize that the belief system
is no t reality itself but what the actor thinks reality is.
His belief system is comprised of many "images" of the past,
present and future. These images, according to Ole R.
Holsti, ". . . may be thought of as the set of lenses
through which information concerning the physical and social
environment is received." 3 As long as the actor's images
are close to the "truth" or facts, he can depend upon
decisions he makes based on these perceptions to produce
expected results (though not always favorable -- they are
expected). However, as K. E. Boulding remarked, "If our
image of tne world is in some sense 'wrong,' of course, we
may be dissapointed in our expectations. . ."* These
incorrect images are latent in the actor's belief system,
and when a fact which dees not fit into the belief system of
images is recognized by the actor, dissonance occurs. Leon
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Festinger, in explaining his theory of cognitive dissonance,
notes that dissonant relationships produce two reactions:
The existence of dissonance, being
psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate
the person to try to reduce the dissonance and
achieve consonance.
When dissonance is present, in addition to
trying to reduce it, the person will actively
avoid situations and information which would
likely increase the dissonance. 5
In the extreme, a strongly held incorrect image or
belief can produce a "perceptual defense" whereby ".
features of the world which are repugnant to a particular
person may not be perceived." 6 Expanding from an individual
to a group belief, Festinger notes that, "It sometimes
happens that a large group of people is able to maintain an
opinion or belief even in the face of continual evidence to
the contrary." 7
Thus images: (1) are something that cannot be avoided
by the actor, (2) help the actor order the mass of stimuli
he receives, (3) when they are close to "reality" produce
"expected" results in the decision-making process, and (4)
when they are wrong, produce dissonance which is either
reduced, resolved or avoided by the actor.
3. IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Images play an important role in international
relations. National images are those that "... a nation
has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which
12

constitute its international environment." 8 Just as for
individuals, there is a link, between these national images
and international relations:
decision-makers act upon their definition of
the situation and their images of states
others as well as their own. These images are
in turn dependent upon the decision-maker's
belief system and these may or may not be
accurate representations of reality. 9
Thus, national images and belief syste-ms can also
produce expected or unexpected results in international
relations depending en how close to reality the images and
Deliefs are.. In his latest study of P erce ption and
ili^perception in International P olit ics, Robert Jervis shows
that as any other individual, "... when a statesman has
developed a certain image of another country he will
maintain that view in the face of large amounts of
discrepant information. . . " 10
Nations can use images to further national interests or
objectives. Again, Robert Jervis:
A symbolic victory can lead otners to see high
resolve and risk-taking in a state's behavior.
This image is apt to make other states retreat
or act cautiously in conflicts with the first
state. Similarly, saving face can contribute
to later successes. If in a major defeat a
state salvages enough to credinly claim that
its efforts were not wasted, or its policies
completely mistaken, others will not te able
tc count on the state's avoiding similar
situations. This image can then provide the
13

state with a significant degree of
deterrence. x 1
It is because images are not reality that a state can ".
. . consciously influence others' images of it without
paying the price of altering its basic behavior and
sacrificing other goals, including the goals these images
are designed to serve." 12
When nations are in conflict, either active or "cold
war," images take on added importance. The protagonists
will generally "... internalize a stereotype of their
enemy that consists exclusively of evil cr contemptible
characreristics, but, on the other hand, of themselves and
their allies as possessors of the best human qualities." 13
Once this is accomplished, as Jervis points cut, ". . . an
actor can use the image he claims he nas of the other to
justify certain actions that otherwise would lead the other
to adopt an undesireable image of him." 14
Images can also make tools out of states. Images become
dysfunctional when they do net coincide in some way with
reality. Decisions based upon inaccurate images, whether
created by the deception of another national actor or not,
will not fulfill expectations. Holsti notes the two-edged
sword of inaccurate images. "Erroneous images may also
prove to have a distorting effect by encouraging the
reinterpretation of information that does not fit the image
. .
." 15 even when the information is correct. One may well
ask why a national actor would maintain his beliefs when it
is "clear" that events are proving him wrong, and may be
endangering the nation. It is because the reality in which
the actor operates is self-constructed and may not match the
reality which events are revealing. Thus a national actor
can be caught in a never-ending logic loop: it is difficult
14

for events to change an actor's beliefs because his
perception of events is selected by those beliefs. 16 Jervis
summarized well the dangers of dysfunctional images:
Not being aware of the inevitable influence of
beliefs upon perception often has unfortunate
consequences. If a decision-maker thinks that
an event yields self-evident and unambiguous
inferences when in fact these inferences are
drawn because of his pre-existing views, he
will grow too confident of his views and will
prematurely exclude alternatives because he
will conclude that the event provides
independent support for his beliefs. 17
C. IMAGES OF ARABS AND THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR
The 1973 Middle East war surprised most Arab-Israeli
watchers, especially in Israel and the United States. Even
after Egypt began the canal crossing, the U.S. Government
assured itself that there would be no war — that Egypt
would not attack. How could two of the best intelligence
agencies in the world be so wrong in their analyses? Why
were these who did realize what was going to happen
overruled or ignored by superiors?
Much hindsight has been applied to answering these
questions and others. Israel convened the Agranat
Commission of Inquiry to examine the responsibility of the
military and civilian authorities for the failure to
anticipate the war and for lapses in the initial conduct of
the war. Within the U.S. Government, assessments also took
place. In answering the question of how the U.S. failed to
properly interpret information that was at hand, one might
15

point to a functional failure or perhaps a systemic defect
in the structure of the intelligence community. However,
another factor must be recognized as the principal "reason"
for the pre-war intelligence failure, and the western
world's surprise at the initial successes of the Arab
armies, who only six years earlier were, in their own view,
humiliated on the same battlefield. This factor was the
American and Israeli image of the Arabs.
John Amos, in his study, The October Warj A Study in
the Politics of Escalati on , points to an Israeli-held image
of the Arabs that was ". . . the basic political assumption
of Isra'ili policy vis-a-vis bordering Arab states: the
assessment that Arab efforts at military cooperation will be
limited and piecemeal at best. . . "ia This image was that
the Arabs were factionated, that they could not get alcng on
little matters, let alone sometning as important and
difficult as a coordinated attack on Israel. Remembering
the circular logic of images, one can point to the events of
the 1967 war and the Arab disunity over the
Palestinian- Jordanian civil war in 1970 (to name only two
recent cases), to find the source of the image. This image
(along with other "unreal" images) was strong enough that it
acted as a perceptual defense or cognitive screen and
suppressed or filtered out messages that could not be
reconciled with the images. An example of this process
occurred as American and Israeli intelligence officers tried
to explain the sudden departure from Egypt and Syria of the
Russian civilian advisors and their families two days before
the war began. Former Secretary of State Kissinger ".
acknowledged that the American government missed the meaning
of the evacuation . . . Because the government was certain
that the Arabs were too weak to contemplate starting a
war." 19 Secretary Kissinger stated:
the explanation we gave -co t his information
16

was absurd: it was that a crisis broke out
between Egypt and Syria on the one hand, and
the Soviet Union on the other, and that the




Thus twc images of the Arabs (that they are facticnated
and weak militarily) had a dysfunctional effect on the
Israeli and American perceptions of reality in October 1973.
That their mis perception caused "unfortunate consequences"
for both understates the impact of the war. Not only were
the military perspectives altered, but both Israeli and Arab
societies were affected, and truly, the Middle East should
no longer be viewed in the pre-1973 war terms.
17

III. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
A. METHODOLOGY
To achieve the objectives stated in the introduction,
the general procedure known as content analysis was used.
The material for analysis was taken from the Ne_w York T ime s
during the period 1967 to 1975 inclusive. The Times was
selected for two reasons. First, it is a "prestige"
publication. As described by Ithiei deSola Pool, "The T ime s
(of New York) has long been regarded as the American
prestige paper. . . " 21 Eernard Cohen agrees: "There can be
no guestion that the New York Times is of prime importance.
.
."22 Second, the Times provides the most detailed and
comprehensive coverage of the Middle East news available to
the American public. The Times reports the small as well as
the big stories involving Arab nations and people, and with
a circulation of about a million copies daily, the limes,
more than any other single news source, is able to present
an image of the Arabs to the American public. It is
inferred that this presen ted image is representative of the
image of Arabs actually held by Americans.
The data analyzed included signed and unsigned
editorials, wire-agency stories and any other stories or
articles about Arab nations or people. The actual number of
news sources came to eight including, in descending
frequency: (1) iJew York Time s Special, (2) Reuters, (3)
Associated Press (AP)
, (4) Editorials, (5) United Press
International (DPI)




, (7) Agence France Presse (AFP) and (8)
Times London (TL) . The Arab nations include Libya, Iraq,
Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates (UAE) , Yemen, South Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain and
Oman. Qatar was theoretically included, but no data was
collected on that state. Additonal data was collected for
the Palestinians and Arabs in general. These nations and
peoples are called "Referrents.
"
The sample consisted of every 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th,
25th and 30th days of each month. This sample size (648
issues over the nine-year period), " . . . reduces the
universe of relevant data to manageable proportions [barely]
without introducing biases which preclude valid
generalization from the sample back to the universe." 23
The coding procedure was to first place the article in
either a favorable, unfavorable or neutral image category.
If the article was favorable or unfavorable, it was then
coded as to the single dominant theme it presented. The
possible theme categories into which an article was placed
were developed from the data as it was analyzed. This
insured that the theme categories were: (1) exhaustive
all relevant items in the sample were capable of being
placed in a category, (2) independent — assignment of any
case to a category did not affect the classification of
other data and (3) mutually exclusive — no case was placed
in more than one category. 2 * Appendix A is a copy of the
code sheet used in its final form.
A total of 2,401 articles (cases) were collected and
coded. Because of the large number of cases, a computer was
used to tabulate and analyze data. The program used for the
analysis was the Statistical Package for the Socia l Sciences
(SPSS) . Although there are dimensional and format
limitations with SPSS that are inconvenient, generally it is
19

an adequate system, and totally necessary when handling this
much data.
A validation test was run on the first 448 codings.
People were selected at random and asked to code two cases,
one of which was the same for everyone. The results were a
78% agreement on the image category (favorable, neutral,
unfavorable) designated by the author and a 62% agreement on
the theme designated. Based on these results, the research
methodology and design are valid and the codings are
reliable to the point someone else could repeat the project
and the results would not be significantly altered.
At this point a brief discussion of a bias in the
reportage of the New York T ime s is called for. It has been
noted by some that the Times is pro-Israeli (as opposed to
unbiased or pro-Arab) on the issues in the Middle East and
is therefore a poor choice for this study. To determine the
extent of such a bias a comparison of the "editorial" source
and all other sources was made covering the entire nine-year
period. The results of the analysis show that for all other
sources the image category ratings were: Favorable
13.0%, Neutral -- 36.0% and Unfavorable — 51.0%. Fcr the
editorial sources, the image category ratings
were: Favorable --17.1%, Neutral — 20.3% and Unfavorable —
62.6%. The editorial ratings were 4.1% higher in favorable
images and 11.6% higher in unfavoraDle images. If this
shows an editorial bias, its effect on this study is
mitigated by the fact that editorial sources accounted for
only 123 out of 2,401 cases — or 5.1%. In any case, the
bias would not affect the ability to note trends in the




The paper is subsequently divided into chapters by
referrents. Chapter 4 presents the aggregate results cf the
entire study, that is: The American Image of the Arabs.
Chapters 5 through 11 discuss the image categories and
themes for Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia
and Libya, respectively. Chapter 12 does the same for a
group of national referrents that have been combined because
of their infrequent (<1.5%) occurrence. This group
includes: Yemen, South Yemen, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates
(UAE) , Oman and Bahrain. American images of the
Palestinians are presented in Chapter 13. Because not all
readers will have interests in all countries, a synopsis of
the findings in chapters 5 through 13 is presented at the
beginning of each. The final chapter deals with the fourth
objective of the paper -- drawing conclusions from the data
and determining what significance the study might have for
future policy formulation.
The notes and bibliography sections deal only with
sources used and cited in the first three chapters and the
conclusion and follow normal style dictates. All ether
material is from the New York Times and will be cited in the
text with a shortened title, as shown in the example below.
. . it was reported that if Lebanon herself
received air-defense help from the Arab
nations, that aid would be extended to the
[refugee] camps. ("Lebanon Asks Arab Aid .
.
," 25 Jun. 74, p. 3, c. 1 .)
21

IV, AMERICAN IMAGES OF AEAES
There were a total of 2,401 cases counted in the
nine-year period. The frequencies per referrent varied from
679 for Egypt to zero for Qatar. Figure 1 shews the
frequencies for each referrent. The referrent "Arabs"
requires explanation. If a news article included more than
one of the referrents, so that it was impossible to place it
clearly in a single file, or if no national referrent was
mentioned, then it was counted in the "Arabs" file. As one
can see, this accounts for a large number of cases (652 or
27.2%) . These cases are included in the aggregate data in
this chapter and are net counted in any other chapter.
Figure 2 shows the case count for each year cf the
study. Ranging from a high of 419 in 1974 to a low of 189
in 1971, the cases by year do not necessarily reflect the
major events that transpired. For instance, the war years,
1967 and 1973, are two of the lowest in number of cases.
The peace efforts of 1974 and the rfar of Attrition, the
Palestinian — Jordanian war and President Nasser's death in




The American image of Arabs has beer, generally
unfavorable. The table below summarizes the image category
ratings.
************************************************************
Arab Image Cat ego r ies (Percentage)
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Study Total 13.2 35. 2 51.6
1967 Total 12.7 16.7 70.6
1975 Total 16.8 35.9 47. 3
************************************************************
One can see that although the favorable ratings did not
increase significantly during the period, the neutral rating
doubled frcm the first to tne last years, and the
unfavorable rating fell dramatically. Figure 3 shows the
aggregate category ratings by year, and although there are
bad years as far as the rating is concerned, the trend to a
less unfavorable, if not more favorable, image is
unmistakable. Figure 4 shows the aggregate image ratings
for each referrent. The chapters that follow will discuss




To better understand the components of the unfavorable
image Americans have of the Arabs, the image has been
disaggregated into specific themes. Figure 5 shows the
themes that make up the favorable (101 to 112) and
unfavorable '(301 to 312) images (code is neutral) . Cf the
24 themes discovered, the ten most frequent are unfavorable.
The first five of these will be discussed in detail as will
the three most frequent favorable themes. Figure 6 shows
the themes as they occurred in each year.
1 • Arabs Are or S upp ort Terrorists iCode 3 04}_
This was the most frequently occurring theme, and it
describes two characteristics. Those Arabs who are
terrorists are primarily the Palestinians (see Chapter
XIII) , but those who s upport terrorists make a much larger
group. Only Saudi Arabia, of the major national referrents,
received no such themes. A particularly strong T imes
editorial denounced this support:
Palestine commando groups and the Arab
states supporting them have repeatedly
asserted that there are no limits to their
warfare against Israel. The Arab world has
applauded as heros the murderers and criminals
who have attacked Israel and Israel-bound
planes at European airports and in flight.




In the aftermath of the Munich killings, the United
States took action which brought the terrorist theme to
include those Arabs living in the U.S.:
The Nixon Administration, acting on a
promise by the President to protect Israeli
citizens in the United States from terrorist
attacks, has begun a major effort to identify
Arabs residing in this country who are
suspected of planning terrorism and tc screen
travelers from Arab nations more carefully.
("U.S. Checks . .
.
,
" 5 Oct. 72, p. 1, c. 7.)
One of the types of "support" that Arab states gave to
terrorists was -chat of a haven to which they could come
after committing their acts. In early 1974, two separate
incidents; one in which the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP) attacked the Shell Oil refinery in
Singapore, and another in which members of the Japanese Red
Army seized the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait, saw the
guerrillas given refuge by South Yemen:
Nine guerrillas who flew to Southern Yemen
after terrorist actions in Singapore and
Kuwait have been given freedom to leave the
country when they wish and were awaiting
instructions from their ccmmands . . . ("9
Guerrillas . . .,'» 10 Feb. 74, p. 7, c. 1.)
2 . Arabs Are Fact iona ted and Disunited (Code 3 3)_
Much of the disunity that was found among the Arabs had
25

to do with the Palestinians. Following the Eabbat
Conference in January 1970, Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, an
Egyptian journalist and Nasser-confidant conceded that:
the conference of 14 Arab countries and the
Palestinian commandos had ended in such
"confusing ambiguity" that it was still
impossible to determine . . . whether it had
been a total failure or a limited success.
The inability of the diverse Arab
countries to achieve unity Mr. Keykal said,
was damaging to the Arabs "in the face of our
enemies and in the eyes of our friends."
("Cairo Editor . . .," 10 Jan. 70, p. 8, c.
3.)
Early in 1972, when the Arabs attempted to put some of
the blame en Moscow for the stalemate in Middle East peace
efforts, tne Soviet bloc countries responded pointedly:
Eastern European sources . . . said that
blaming others for their failures had been a
main reason for Arab weakness. They referred
to persistent Arab disunity and expressed the
belief that Arabs were suffering from a lack
of leadership. ("Arabs Criticize . . .," 30
Jan. 72, p. 2 , c. 3
.
)
As President Sadat made it clear, early in 1975, that ne
favored seme type of settlement with Israel in the Sinai, ha
became the object of pressures designed to prevent such an
accord. In March, the P.L.O. sent a delegation to see Mr.
Sadat about a possible Sinai accord:
26

Mr. Sadat angrily refused to receive the
delegation, saying that Palestinian
Egyptian relations, but 'not Egyptian foreign
policy, was an apt subject for discussion
between his Government and the Palestine
Liberation Organization.
The Syrians and the Palestinians, who were
the most outspoken after Libya's Muammar
al-Qaddafi, in expressing their distrust of
the Egyptians, did not fear that Mr. Sadat
would accept nonbelligerency, but that he
would go too far in making concessions short
of that. ("Mr. Sadat . .
.
,
" 30 Mar. 75, Sec.
4, p. 4, c. 4.)
Arab disunity was also suggested by the freguent
disagreements within O.P.E.C. over the price of oil:
A ministerial conference of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
moved today toward what was expected to be a
modest price increase for oil, but conflicts
developed, chiefly between Saudi Arabia and
the militant members, over the size of the
increase. ("Saudis and OPEC . . . , " 25 Sep.
75, p. 65, c. 4.)
3 • i£a bs Are Militant a nd B ellige rent JCode 3 OJX
One aspect of this theme was that it became associated
not just with the Arab nation-states, nut also with Islam.
In the example below, the true meaning of "Jihad" — to




"Jihad" -- holy war — against Israel was
the watch-word here again last week. Bearded
Islamic scholars from mora than a score of
Moslem nations decreed that "sacrifice of
blood and treasure in "Jihad" had become the
duty of the faithful all over the world."
("Arabs Talk . . .," 20 Oct. 68, Sec. 4, p. 6,
c. 1.)
As the 1970 War of Attrition heated up, the Arabs made
it clear that they were ready to continue the fight:
The five Arab "confrontation countries"
vowed today to fight en for the recovery of
lands captured by Israel, thus implicitly
rejecting endeavors by major powers to restore
the 1967 cease-fire between the United Arab
Republic and Israel. ("5 Arab . . .," 10 Feb.
70, p. 1, c. 1 .)
At the 1974 Rabbat Conference, Yasir Arafat's comments
were clear, if more muted:
Today is the turning point in the history
of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation.
I vow to continue the struggle until we meet
in Jerusalem with the same smiling faces we
see here tonight. ("Arabs Agree . . .," 30
Oct. 74, p. 1, c. 1.)
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4 • ££abs Are Anti -U. S . or P ro- Soviet iCode 307}_
The United States' support for Israel was the main cause
of the anti-U.S. character of this theme:
. . . the United States of America is adopting
a new hostile attitude against the Arab nation
and unveiling its real links with Zionism and
with the Israeli expansionist plan.
The United States support and
consolidation for the purpose of expansion and
continued aggression come at a time when
Israel has violated the whole of Palestine . .
("Text of . . .," 10 Feo. 70, p. 3, c. 1.)
President Nasser was particularly irritated by the
United States over the years. Mr. Heykal described Nasser
as:
. . being deeply suspicious of Washington's
policies, from his rise to power in 1952 until
his death . . . the Egyptian .leader considered
himself to be the victim of "double dealing,"
"political blackmail" and "threats" by what he
viewed as often conflicting positions of the
White House, the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Department and tne influence of
private United States oil interests.
("Nasser's Ire . . .," 30 Aug. 71, p. 10, c.
4.)
Despite the impasse that developed between Egypt and the
Soviet Union, Israel, for one, was not ready to say that the
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Moscow and Cairo rift was irrevocable. They pointed to the
long-term character of Soviet aid to the Arabs:
Israel reckons that the Russians are a
poor people with a rich government which is
allowed to act as the U.S. State Department
and Pentagon might act if not controlled by
Congress. One result is that Moscow has
invested $21 billion in the Middle East since
1955, only $6 billion of which went to
nonmilitary projects. ("Bleak View . . .," 20
Oct. 74, Sec. 4, p. 5, c. 5.)
5 • ASAh Gov ernments Are Def ectiv e J_C od e 305)
The repressive measures taken by Iraq in 1969 (see
Chapter IX) in dealing with its Jewish population was
generalized to include the Arab world:
Beyond the immediate issue of the threat
to Jewish citizens in Iraq and seme ether Arab
nations the current hysreria in Iraq is
symptomatic of a fundamental political
instability that is indemic throughout much of
the Arab world. Wherever such domestic
instability exists, the problems of peace and
security for neighboring states are inevitably
complicated. ("Lessons From . . . , " 30 Jan.
69, p. 34, c. 1 .)
The 1970 war in Jordan with the Palestinians was a
mixed-bag for the Israelis. While pleased to see the
Palestinian defeat, there was:
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some concern in Israel . . . that recent
turmoil in Jordan could spread to Lebanon and
lead to a weakening of the already limited
control that Arab governments exercise over
Palestinian guerrillas. ("Israelis
Concerned," 15 Jun. 70, p. 13, c- 1.)
Israel's prediction was proved correct as the fragile
political system in Lebanon was buffeted by the activities
of the Palestinians and the government's inability to deal
with them:
A leading editor, Edward Saab, brooded
darkly: "At the point where we are in this
civil war that is bloodying the country, and
with the confusion of interests and
ideologies, the Lebanese are condemned to
eliminate each other without this massacre
being translated into a clear-cut victory or
defeat." ("Lebanon's Violence . . .," 15 Sep
75, p. 1, c. 2.)
6 • Ara b s Are Real isti c and Moderate ICode 108)
Not all Arab plans to recover their lest territories
were based exclusively on military options:
. . . the Egyptians . . . concluded that the
backing of world opinion was essential if the
Arabs were to recover their occupied
territories, whether by diplomacy or war.




Although the dominant Syrian theme in 1974 was its
militant and belligerent attitude toward Israel (see Chapter
VII) and a possible peace settlement, -a more positive theme
was also found:
Since the coup in 1971, President Hafez
al-Assad, the 45-year-old former air force
commander, has succeeded in consolidating
political power. He is a nationalist and was
the first Syrian leader to suggest that
moderation and realism in policy against
Israel might be better than unrelenting
hostility. ("Assad's Gift . . . , " 10 Mar. 74,
Sec. 4, p . 2, c . 3
.
)
During the Sinai negotiations in 1975, it was the
Israelis who sometimes were portrayed as uncooperative in
the face of a moderate Arab stance:
Now, however, when the Arab world seems
ready at last to accept an independent Jewish
political state in the Middle East, the
Israelis are not responding positively to this
extended hand. ("Israel's Inflexible . . .,"
15 May 75, p. 43, c. 1.)
7 . Arabs Are United, In Agreement ICod e 105)
One ot the recurrent internal Iraqi problems was the
on-again, off-again Kurdish rebellion. In March of 1970 it

appeared to be off -again:
The [cabinet] appointments fulfilled
pledges made in a March 11 declaration by the
Iraqi Government that recognized the autonomy
of the Kurdish people within an Iraqi state
and that has apparently ended the eight and
one-half year war with the Kurds. ("5 Kurds
Appointed . . .," 30 Mar. 7 0,, p. 5, c. 1.)
The Arab League, in deciding to provide financial
assistance to Lebanon in July of 1974, expressed the unity
of the Arab countries:
Mr. Biad [Secretary of the Arab League]
s a iu that the council reaffirmed the
solidarity of the Arab countries with Lebanon
and their commitment to the defense of
Lebanese territory as well as their support
for what the Palestinians claim as national
rights. ("Arab League . .
.
,
" 5 Jul. 74, p.
3, c. 1.)
Arabs recognized the harmful effect that their disunity
and factionalism had on achieving their political goals.
King Faisal exerted himself to promote Arab unity:
President Assad told King Faisal that
their talks would strengthen Arab solidarity,
which he called "the only way to get what we
want — liberation of the occupied lands and
restoration of usurped Palestinian rights.
("King Faisal . .
.
,
" 15 Jan. 75, p. 3, c. 1.)
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8 • Arabs Are Hilling to Negotiate (Code 10 2)
After almost a year of the War of Attrition, the world
saw signs that Egypt, after Nasser's death, was interested
in dealing with Israel other than on the battlefield:
Officials also interpret various actions
by the new Egyptian leadership under President
Anwar al-Sadat as indications that Cairo is
eager to pursue negotiations with the Israelis
rather than slide back into renewed fighting
along the Suez Canal. ("D.5- Officials
.," 20 Nov. 70, p. 7, c. 1.)
Three years and another full-scale war were to pass
before the hcpes engendered by a new Egyptian regime were to
oe realized. On 27 October 1973, Arab and Israeli
commanders met in the Sinai to discuss details of the
cease-fire and logistical relief to Egypt's encircled III
Corps. The face-to-face meeting was seen as significant:
For the first time in seventeen years,
responsible representatives from Israel and
Egypt have met face to face in formal
negotiations . . .
Arabs and Israelis are at last making a
start toward the kind of negotiations ordered
by the United Nations Security Council.
("Start Talking," 30 Oct. 73, p. 42, c. 2.)
The other major combatant in the war, Syria, was slew to
follow the Egyptian example in being willing to negotiate
3U

anything with Israel. Though the hope was dim, Secretary of
State Kissinger picked up any indication of Syrian
willingness to negotiate:
He [Kissinger] is said to believe that Mr.
Hafez al-Assad of Syria might have given the
Egyptian and Saudi envoys some new assurances
of Syria's willingness to begin disengagement
talks and to release the names of the Israeli
prisoners. ("Kissinger Agrees . . .," 15 Feb.
74, p. 3, c. 4.)
C. SUMMARY
Although the majority of the aggregate image ratings
were unfavorable, the trend over the period has been an
improved American image of the Arans. Though the most
frequent themes were unfavorable, the trend has been a
significant decline in the relative frequency of the
unfavorable themes. The militant, belligerent theme
declined frcm 16.2% of the 1967 cases, to only 2.3% of the
1975 cases. The anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet theme declined from
4.4% of the 1967 cases to only 2.0% in 1975. Other
unfavorable themes whose relative frequencies declined
were: are or support terrorists, defective government,
unyielding or uncompromising, defective military, inhumane,
rash or unrealistic and bad character. Those favorable
themes that increased in relative frequency were:
effective military, progressive, want peace, united and in
agreement, anti-terrorist, realistic or moderate,































o2Q. 64 2.7 2.7 2. 7
64 5. 88 3.7 3.7 6.2
651. 679 28.3 23.3 34.6
652. 174 7.2 7.2 41.9
660. 144 6.0 6.0 47.9
663. 194 8.1 8.1 55.9
67C. 79 3.3 3.3 59. 2
675. 10 0.4 0.4 59.6
678. 22 0.9 0.9 60. 6
681. 36 1.5 1.5 62. 1
690. 26 1.1 1.1 63.1
695. 3 0.1 0.1 63. 2
697. 22 5 9.4 9.4 72.6
698. 5 0.2 0.2 72.
S
699. 652 27.2 27.2 100.
C
TOTAL 2401 10C.0 100.0
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ROk PCT IFAVCRAEL NEUTRAL UNFAVOPA
COL PCT IE BLE
TOT PCT I l.I 2.1 3.
62C. I 5 1 24 I 35
I 7.8 I 37.5 I 54.7
I 1.6 I 2.8 I 2.8
I C.2 I 1.0 I 1.5
645. I 10 I 20 I 58
I 11.4 I 22.7 I 65.9
I 2.2 I 2.4 I 4.7
I C.4 I C.8 I 2.4
651. I 117 I 280 I 282
I 17.2 I 41.2 I 41.5
I 26.9 I 33.1 I 22.8
I 4.9 I 11.7 I 11.7
652. I 19 I 63 I 92
I 10.9 I 36.2 I 52.9
I 6.0 I 7.4 I 7.4
I C.8 I 2.6 I 3.8
66C. I 16 I 41 I 87
I 11.1 I 28.5 I 60.4
I 5.0 I 4.8 I 7.0
I C.7 I 1.7 I 3.6
663. I 55 I 83 I 56
I 28.4 I 42.8 I 28.9
I 17.4 I 9.8 I 4.5
I 2.3 I 3.5 I 2.3
670. I 17 I 41 I 21
I 21. 5 I 51.9 I 26.6
I 5.4 I 4.8 I 1.7










































































































































































































































0. 846 35.2 35.2 35.2
101. 28 1.2 1.2 36.4
102. 36 1.5 1.5 37.9
103. 35 1.5 1.5 39.4
104. 32 1.3 1.3 40.7
105. 39 1.6 1.6 42. 2
106. 27 1.1 1.1 43 .4
107. 33 1.4 1.4 44. 6
108. 50 2.1 2.1 46.9
1J9. 10 0.4 0.4 47.2
110. L2 0.5 0.5 47.
£
111. 5 0.2 0.2 48.0
112. 10 0.4 C.4 48.4
301. 186 7.7 7.7 56. 2
302. 85 3.5 3.5 59.7
303. 190 7.9 7.9 67.6
304. 272 11.3 11.3 79.3
305. 95 4.0 4.0 82.9
306. 62 2.6 2.6 85.5
307. 117 4.9 4.9 90.4
308. 53 2.2 2.2 92.6
309. 16 0.7 0.7 93.2
310. 23 1.0 1.0 94.2
311. 71 3.0 3.0 97.2
312. 68 2.8 2.8 1C0.G
OTAL 2401 100.0 1GC.0
Figure 5 - AGGREGATE — FREQUENCIES BY THEME
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There can be little doubt about the importance of Egypt
in the Middle East, from 1967 to 1975. Over this period,
Egypt accounted for 679 of 2,401 cases, or 28.3%. The next
most frequent referrent was the Palestinians with 9.4%.
Egypt had more cases than any other referrent every year of
the study except for 1974, when Syria was the most
frequently encountered referrent. The distribution of cases
by year is shown in Figure 7. The exceptionally high case
count (149) in 1970 can be accounted for by three
significant events: (1) the "War of Attrition" conducted by
Egypt and Israel across the Suez Canal, (2) an increase in
Soviet-Egyptian interactions which led in 1971 to the Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation and (3) the death of President
Nasser, and the Sadat Government talcing power.
The image ratings for Egypt were: (1) favorable 17.2%,
(2) neutral 41.2% and (3) unfavorable 41.5%, the third best
rating for a major national referrent. The five most
frequent themes were: (1) militant and belligerent (11.0%),
(2) anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet (8.4%), (3) unreliable and
bellicose (5.0%), (4) unyielding and uncooperative (3.7%)
and (5) defective military (3.5%).
Although the dominant themes presented an unfavorable
image of Egypt, there was a definite break between the
post-67 war years (1967 through 1972) and the post-73 war
years (1973 through 1975). Figure 8 depicts the changes
that occurred between the two periods. Although it cannot
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be said that Americans have a favorable image of Egyptians
over the entire period, the trend has clearly been in that
direction, as shown by the ratings for 1974 and 1975.
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES
The Egyptian image categories moved from the most
unfavorable rating in 1967 to a situation in 1975 in which
Egypt had the highest favorable rating of any other
referrent. The table fcelow shows the ratings and compares
them to the aggregate figures.
************************************************************
Egyp t Imag e Cate gor ies (Percentage)
F avora ble Neutral Unfavorable
Egypt Total 17.2 41.2 41.5
Study Total 13.2 35.2 51.6
Egypt 1967 13.7 19.2 67.1
Egypt 1375 26.3 55.3 18.4
************************************************************





Egypt had at least one case in ail but one of the 24
themes that were found. Although Egypt's image is "better"
than the image of the Arabs as a whole, the five most
freguent themes encountered were in the unfavorable image
category. Each of these five themes will be discussed and
examples given, in descending frequency. Figure 10 shows a
crosstabulation of the themes as they occurred in each year.
1 2gy__ptians Are Milit ant a nd Belligerent
This was the most frequent theme, occurring in 11.CS of
the cases. It was the highest in 1967 (24.7%) , but had
decreased to zero in 1975. In 1967, these cases were a
result of the Egyptian activities in the Sinai prior to the
war actually beginning. The very volatile move of
requesting the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNSF) , ending a stay that began after the 1956 Suez War,
portrayed Egyptian belligerence:
there was a series of incidents
Wednesday as Egyptian forces moved in on the
United Nations troops.
Mr. Thant's report revealed that Egyptian
gunners dropped two shells between two
outposts of the Emergency Force yesterday to
reinforce a warning to move out. ("U.N. Troop




The closing, a few days later, of the Straits of Tiran
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by Egypt alsc cast them in the role of the militant:
The United States has officially but
privately warned the United Arab Republic that
it considers the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf
of Aqaba an "act of aggression" and will
oppose it by all possible means. ("U.S. Warns
. . .
," 25 May 67, p . 1, c. 5.)
In 1970, the image of a belligerent Egypt was again
presented, centering primarily on the War of Attrition
across the Suez Canal. President Nasser, buoyed by
shipments of modern weapons from the Soviet Union, had, ". .
repeatedly talked of forcibly taking back lost
territories, at some future date." ("They Fight . . .," 25
Jan. 70, Sec. H
, p. 4, c. 1.)
While the October 1973 war helped change some images of
the Arabs in general and Egypt in particular (as will be
seen momentarily) , it did not help Egypt's image as a
belligerent. In July 1973, one of President Sadat's
advisers upcn his return from a visit to the Soviet Union,
told newsmen that:
the Soviet Union was determined to
strengthen the Egyptian and Arab capability to
confront the Zionist occupation, which is
backed by imperialism, until this aggression
is liquidated and the aspirations of the
Palestinian people are recognized. ("Moscow
and Cairo . . .," 15 Jul. 73, p. 9, c. 1.)
During the 1973 fighting, Egypt's good military
performance was detracted from by the effect of the
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belligerent image. Senator Henry Jackson, in pushing for
military aid to Israel contended that:
Egyptian aggression must not be rewarded
by diplomatic maneuvers that will enable
Israel's enemies, who decided when the war
would start, to decide also when the war will
end. ("Jackson Bids . . .," 15 Oct. p. 21, c.
1.)
Although this militant or belligerent theme was the most
frequent Egyptian theme throughout the study, it nearly
ceased to occur after the 1973 war. In 1974 there were but
two occurrences of the theme, and in 1975 there were ncne.
2 . Egyptians Are Anti -U . S. or Pro-Soviet
This theme occurred in 8.4% of the Egyptian cases, with
71.9% of tnose concentrated in the years 1970 through 1972.
President Nasser made use of his dependence on the Soviets
in trying to influence the United States to cut aid to
Israel. Early in 1970 Nasser warned, "We depend to a great
extent on the Soviet Union ... If the United States gives
50 Phantoms to the Israelis, where do we gc? We have to go
to the Soviet Union . . ." ("Nasser . . .,"5 Feb. 70, p.
15, c. 1 .)
Some of the themes were clearly more anti-U.S. than they
were pro-Soviet:
A further intensification of Arab anger
against the United States has been evoked by




A favorite cartoon in the Arab newspapers
features President Nixon with a Dayan-type eye
patch. ("Cairo Decries . . . , " 20 Feb. 70, p.
1 , c. 7.)
The Soviet supply of military equipment also created a
pro-Soviet image of the Egyptians. In March, 1970, tne
Soviets conducted an extensive military airlift to Cairo
with Soviet aircraft landing or talcing off at a rate of
seven an hour. ("Israeli Jets . . .," 25 Mar. 70, p. 1, c.
2.) During the War of Attrition in 1970, ". . . Soviet
pilots flying combat formations over central Egypt for
defense against raids by the Israeli air force," ("President
Orders . . .," 30 Apr. 70, p. 1, c. 4.) also created a
pro-Soviet image of the Egyptians. Further promoting this
image were reports that "... Soviet forces were manning
SAM-3 missile installations ... in central Egypt." ("Cayan
. .
.
," 10 May 70, p. 13, c. 1.
)
Even the change of leadership in Egypt after the death
of President Nasser did not dispel the anti-U.S. image of
the Egyptians. Referred to as "Egypt's Interim Leader,"
President Sadat was described as ". . . a bitter fee of
Israel and one of the most outspoken critics of the United
States." ("Egypt's . . .," 30 Sep. 70, p. 16, c. 6.)
The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
in May 1971 raised even more concern about Egypt's
pro-Moscow leanings. A Times editorial decried the treaty
commenting that it went ". . . far enough toward cementing
the ties between the two states to raise questions whether
Egypt may be on the way to becoming another Soviet




One should note that the occurrence of the anti-O.S. or
pro-Soviet theme dropped off markedly after 1972. Most
interesting is that it did not occur at all in 1973, the
year of the war. Allowing for some pro-Soviet link,
nonetheless, in 1973, the Egypt- U.S . S . H. break which
surfaced in early 1972, reduced the occurrences of the theme
to five and two in 1974 and 1975 respectively. A causal
relationship can be implied between this decrease in the
pro-Soviet view of Egypt and the decrease in Egyptian
militance and belligerence from 1974 to 1975.
3 • Egyptians Are Unr eli able and gellicose
This theme should be expanded to include images that
Egyptians distort the truth, violate agreements, are
propagandists, exaggerate, are imaginative, cannot keep
secrets and use threatening rhetoric. The theme is
concentrated in 1970 and 1971 and was found in 5.0% of the
Egyptian cases.
A distinctly bellicose image is portrayed in an
editorial that appeared in mid-1970 as the United States was
trying to arrange a cease-fire in the War of Attrition:
But Israel's reluctance to accept any truce
that might enable the Egyptians to build up
their defensive and offensive forces on the
West bank of the Suez Canal is understandable
in view of the persisting boastful
belligerence of President Nasser and his Arab
friends. Unlike the Israelis, the Egyptian
leader has so far responded publicly to the
American proposals only with more fire-eating




Once a truce was arranged, the view of Egyptian
unreliability emerged because the United States first
suspected and then confirmed that Egypt had violated the
truce agreement by moving SAM-2 missile batteries closer to
the Canal:
Yesterday, the State Department announced
that the United States had confirmed evidence
of the deployment of anti-aircraft missiles in
the standstill zone, which extends for 32
miles on each side of the canal. ("Cairo
Terms . . .,"5 Sep. 70, p. 1, c. 6.)
As peace negotiations picked-up in January, 1971, prior
to the expiration of the Suez truce, Israel used the image
that Egyptians cannot keep secrets as a lever in the talks:
Premier Golda Meir and Foreign Minister
Abba Eban reportedly took the lead in urging
that United Arab Republic polemics and
breaches of diplomatic secrecy not be used as
a pretext for halting the discussions
("Israel to Stay . . .," 25 Jan. 71, p. 13, c.
3.)
The "Rogers' Plan," in early 1971, was impeded by the
Israelis' perception of the Egyptians as unreliable when it
came to keeping agreements:
Israelis still remember their bitter
experience of last August, when a loosely
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worded cease-fire and military standstill
arrangement drawn up by the United States was
violated, within hours of coining into force by
the Soviet-Egyptian missile build-up on the
canal's western bank. ("Israelis Said . . .,"
30 Apr. 71, p. 2, c. 4.)
4 • Egy ptians Are Unyi el ding and Uncooperative
Occurring in 3.7% of the Egyptian cases, this theme was
most frequent, expectedly, following fighting and during the
various attempts at negotiated cease-fires and
disengagements in 1968, 1970 and 1975. In 1975, it was the
most frequent unfavorable theme.
Early in 1968, peace talks, under the aegis of United
Nations Secretary General Gunnar Jarring, were repeatedly
stalled by Egypt's unwillingness to negotiate with Israel:
The United Nations' envoy [Jarring] . . . has
been told by the Egyptian Government that it
"categorically" refuses to send
representatives to Cyprus for contacts with
Israel at any time "in the present and in the
future." ("New Hitch . . .," 10 Mar. 68, Sec.
4, p. 4, c. 1.)
The Israelis, using this image of intransigence, put the
onus for tne peace talk failures on the Arans:
The prevailing view among Israeli leaders
is that while' the mission [Jarring's peace
mission] serves a purpose, there is little
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likelihood of any real achievements while the
United Arab Republic refuses to negotiate with
them. ("Eban Said . . .," 15 Nov. 68, p. 15,
c. 1.)
Prior to the 1970 cease-fire across the Suez, Egypt's
hard stand fostered the uncooperative image:
Mr. Nasser took an unyielding position
against making any territorial concessions to
Israel, and even dismissed a suggestion of a
limited cease-fire during Jewish and Moslem
religious holidays. ("Nasser . . .," 15 Feb.
70, p. 1 , c. 5.)
In 1975, as Secretary Kissinger was "shuttling" to bring
about the Sinai disengagement, it was the Israelis who drew
much of the criticism about being unyielding. Angrily, they
pointed the finger at Egypt:
"It's a stab in the back," a senior Israeli
official said . . . "We are being blamed for
the breakdown when in fact it was Egypt who
refused to alter its opening position in the
talks."
"The Knesset holds the Government of Egypt
responsible for the suspension of negotiations
for an interim agreement." ("Bitter Israelis
. .
.
," 25 Mar. 75, p. 1 , c. 6.
)
In mid-1975 this unfavorable image was further
reinforced when President Sadat turned down abruptly an
Israeli proposal for a compromise in the Sinai:
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Although the nature of the Egyptian reply was
secret, it was reliably reported that the
Egyptians had not budged from their refusal to
make a formal declaration of non-belligerency
at this time. ("Cairo Gives . . .," 25 Jun.
75. p. 14, c. 2.)
5 Egypt's Mi litary is Defe ctiv e
The 1967 war saw repeated occurrences cf this theme,
which accounts for 3.5% of all Egyptian cases. The opposite
theme — effective military — did not occur in 1967. The
1973 war changed the world's perception of Egypt's military
capability. The effective military theme occurred more
frequently than did the defective military theme in 1973.
The 1967 debacle caused the image of' an incapable and
corrupt Egyptian military to receive world-wide attention:
A Belgrade radio correspondent reported
today that the United Arab Republic lost the
war with Israel because its officers were more
concerned with tennis and ice cream than with
fighting the Israelis. ("Yugoslav . . .," 25
Jun. 67, p. 20, c. 1.)
The 1967 defeat had its effect on the Egyptian
self-image as well as on that of the rest of the world:
"The world's gone crazy," says one
Egyptian sergeant in a popular tale. "Every
10 years or so we are loaded on trucks and
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driven hundreds of miles into the desert.
Then suddenly the convoy comes to a halt and
we are ordered to walk back to base as fast as
we can." ("Luster . . .," 5 Aug. 67, p. 2, c.
Another characteristic of the same theme was that when
Egypt's military was not being routed by the Israelis they
were back home plotting the overthrow of the government:
Former Vice President Abdel Hakim Amer,
who was dismissed as deputy supreme commander
of the United Arab Republic's armed forces
after the defeat by Israel in June, may be
court-martialed for attempting to stage a
military comeback. ("Amer . . .," 5 Sep. 67,
p . 15, c. 1
.
)
During the 1969 and 1970 fighting across the Suez Canal,
Egypt's military scored some successes. However, these were
overshadowed by Israeli operations that not only were
successful to the point of being spectacular, but
embarassingly pointed up Egypt's limited military
capabilities
:
At this moment typewriters must be
clacking away in half the film studies of the
Western make believe world as writers
reconstruct the latest thriller pulled off by
the Israeli James Bonds, who snatched a sever.
ton radar station from an Egyptian coastal
position on the Gulf of Suez and, with the
help of powerful helicopters, made it




Before Soviet pilots began flying a protective
"umbrella" around Cairo in early 1970, Israeli fighters had
what amounted to unopposed access to the capitol and pointed
to the ineffectiveness of Egypt's air force:
The Israeli planes had the skies to
themselves. No Egyptian fighters appeared . .
. to challenge them.
The Egyptians have numerical superiority
over the Israelis in jet fighters, but they
sorely lack sufficiently trained pilots.
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Jordan was the third most frequent referrent in the
study, with 194 cases accounting for 8.1% of the total.
Over half of these cases occurred in the years 1968 and
1970. In both of those years, Jordan was involved with the
Palestinians, but in opposite situations, as explained
below. The distribution of Jordans's cases in each year is
shown in Figure 1 1
.
The image ratings for Jordan were: (1) favorable 28.4%,
(2) neutral 42.8% and (3) unfavorable 23.9%, the best rating
of the major national referrents. Jordan's unfavorable image
ratings were concentrated in the 1967-1970 period. Over the
last five years of the study, the unfavorable ratings
declined to zero. Figure 12 compares the image category
ratings for the two periods.
The five most frequent themes were (1) are or support
terrorists (9.3%), (2) anti-terrorist — extremist (8.2%),
(3) factionated and disunited (6.7%), (4) want peace (5.2%)
and (5) militant and belligerent (4.6%). The factional and
disunited theme at least partially explains the fact that
the other four most frequent themes were paired opposites.
IMAGE CATEGORIES
Americans have a tetter image of Jordan than they do of
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any other major Arab referrent. The category breakdown for
the entire period is shown in the table below with aggregate
figures fcr comparison.
**************** ** ******************************************
Jordan Image Cat ego r ies (Percentage)
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable









Jordan 1975 33.3 b7.7 0.0
************************************************************
Jordan's favorable rating was the highest in the study,
and its unfavorable rating was, next to Saudi Arabia, the
lowest. Figure 13 shows the trends over the period. At all
times, Jordan's image ratings were better than the
aggregate.
B. THEMES
The dominant themes found in Jordan's cases tell the
story of the Hashemite Kingdom's see-saw position in the
Aran world. Two of the five most freguent themes are
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favorable, and the first two are opposites. Each of these
themes will be discussed separately. Figure 14 shows the
themes as they occurred by year.
1 • Jordanians Are or Su ppo rt Terrorists
In 1968, commando groups, operating from Jordan and
laying mines in Israeli-held territory, took their toll on
Israeli farmers. In August, the Israeli Air Force struck at
what were called a "terrorist command center and training
camp" near Amman. Israel was quick to point out that it
held Jordan responsible for the commando's ability to
operate:
General Bar-Lev described today's action
as a "substantial and unexpected blew to the
terrorist organizations," and added: "I hope
this will help the authorities in Jordan to
finally realize that violations of the
cease-fire will bring unpleasant consequences.
("Israeli Jets . . .," 5 Aug. 68, p. 1, c. 1.)
In November of 1968, Jordan and the commando groups
worked out a formal agreement which seemed to confirm Jordan
in the terrorist camp:
The seven-point agreement disclosed last
week between the Jordanian Government and
commando groups operating from Jordan is
regarded by students of Arab politics as a
tentative step toward the creation of what
some have called "the commando state."
("Jordan Pact . . .," 25 Nov. 68, p. 4, c. 3.)
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Early in 1970 King Hussein was beginning to change his
view of supporting the commando operations, feeling thai:
they posed a threat to his own control. Nevertheless, in
February of that year, Hussein was still trying to project
the image that he supported tne guerrilla movement's
activities:
Brushing aside a suggestion that he had
been obliged to back down by the growing power
of the commando movement. King Hussein
declared, "The power of the commandos is our
power, and our power is their power."
("Hussein Explains . . . , 15 Feb. 70, p. 19,
c. 1
.)
In April of 1970, King Hussein reorganized his
Government. The timing and new assignments solidified
further the image that Jordan supported the guerrilla
movement
:
Two Jordanian Army Officers known to be on
good terms with Palestinian guerrillas were
appointed to key posts in Cabinet and military
changes announced in Amman tonight.
("Jordanian Generals . . .," 20 Apr. 70, p. 9,
c. 1
.)
Only weeks before the outbreak of fighting between the
commandos and the King's troops, Israel was still using the
image of Jordanian support for the commandos to justify
their military actions:
Announcing the attacks, the [Israeli]
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spokesman said that the targets "were those of
the Jordanian Army, which assists terrorists
and makes it possible for them to act against




" 15 Aug. 70, p. 1, c. 8.)
2 • Jordan Is Anti-Ter ro ris t/Extremis t
This theme was undetected until late 1969 and then
emerged as a dominant theme in 1970 and 1971. As tensions
built up between the commando groups and Jordan in the
summer of 1970, King Hussein began signalling his concern
about the effect the commando operations were having en the
country
:
King Hussein of Jordan, in a television
speech tonight, warned Arab commandos that "we
shall deal with any attempt to undermine our
national unity with whatever means are
necessary." ("Hussein Cautions . . .," 30
Aug. 70, p. 5 , c. 1
.
)
As "Black September" dawned in Jordan, King Hussein,
under intense pressure from his military, unleashed his
armed forces to bring the commandos under control. The
Palestinians and regular Jordanian forces fought viciously
throughout the country. The King's forces were held at bey
at Dawson Field, North of Amman, by a spectacular
multi-hijacking by the P.F.L.P. It was, however, Jordanian
forces which ultimately freed the last of the hostages from
a downtown hotel where the commandos had hidden them. The
drama of looking for the hostages drew world concern and




Diplomatic sources said the western countries
want to know if talks with the guerrillas
would weaken the King's position on the
recurrent fighting with the commandos. ("West
Seeks . . .," 20 Sep. 70, p. 21, c. 1.)
By the end of the month the King's armed forces had,
with much difficulty, "defeated" the Palestinians and
further promoted the anti-terrorism theme as well as the
favorable image- of a competent military.:
As seen from here, the King of Jordan not
only survived his seven-day war against
militant Palestinian guerrillas, he also
prevailed. He was able to expel them from his
capital and to inflict heavy punishment on the
Syrians who had tried to help carve out a
guerrilla sanctuary in northern Jordan. ("The
First Round . . .," 25 Sep. 70, p. 14, c. 5.)
In the summer or 1971, King Hussein again moved against
the commandos:
Jordan announced today that her troops had
been battling Palestinian commandos in the
northern hills since yesterday in an attempt
to push them away from inhabited areas.
("Jordan Acknowledges . . .," 15 Jul. 71, p.
7, c. 3.)
3y the end of July, Jordan claimed to have totally
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defeated the commandos. Premier Mustafa Tal, who was
assassinated by members of Black September at a Cairo Arab
League meeting on 28 November 1971, claimed that:
the commandos had lest ail their bases in
Jordan and that "subversive" commando groups
such as the left-wing Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine would not be allowed
to operate from Jordan frcm now on. ("2,300
Guerrillas . . .," 20 Jul. 71, p. 1, c. 6.)
The image of Jordan as being anti-terrorist and
extremist has a high potential for dysf unctionalism . If one
too blizhely perceives Jordan's actions in 1970 and 1971 as
meaning a lack of support for the Palestinian "cause,"
unexpected results are sure to occur. Although Hussein
earned for himself epithets such as the "Hashemite Harlot"
and the "Dwarf King" :or his prosecution or the
Palestinians, he at no time has disavowed their cause.
Despite the image that was created, Hussein's actions were
more motivated by internal pressures than any desire to
"exterminate" the Palestinian commandos.
3 • ii°£dan !§. Factionated and Disunited
With tne two most dominant themes being opposites, it is
not surprising that factionalism and disunity would occur
freguently in the Jordanian cases. This theme was found
almost exclusively (10 of 13 occurrences) in 1970 and was
the dominant theme in that year.
The battle between the commandos and the King's army
reflected more than just the surface dichotomies in Jordan:

The point is that the soldier was a
Bedouin of the east bank of the Jordan River
and the fedayeen were Palestinians of the west
bank. This made their scuffle a microcosm of
the basic conflict that divides Jordanian
society. ("Old Enmities . . .,"5 Jul. 70, p.
14, c. 3.)
Although the King's forces were "victorious" in their
battle with the commandos, not all members of Hussein's
military favored such strong actions:
The resignation of Brigadier Daoud
[Premier of Jordan's military government] came
amid evidence of increasing pressure by the
conferrence of Arab leaders on King Hussein
and the guerrillas for a cease-fire and a
settlement of their conflict. ("Letter . .
.
,
25 Sep. 70, p. 14, c. 3.
)
Even after the civil war had ended, and what remained of
the commandos were being relocated from Amman, the disunity
engendered by the fighting continued to surface:
Some Arabs said that a "madman" had fired
a rocket at the house of Habes al-Majali, who
was regarded as the strongman in the military
government that fought Jordan's nine-day civil
war . . . ("Blast Hear . . .," 5 Oct. 70, p.
3 , c. 5.)
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4 • Jo£^§H Wan ts P eac e
The theme that Jordan wants peace was the most
consistent of the Jordanian themes, occurring in seven out
of the nine years analyzed. King Hussein created a
favorable image of himself and his country by emphasizing
his desire for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East
conflict
:
King Hussein has chosen a poet-diplomat,
Abdel Monem Rifai, to head his Government in
an apparent effort ... to underscore his
hopes for a peaceful Middle East settlement.
("New Cabinet . . .," 25 Mar. 69, p. 20, c.
2.)
King Hussein's hopes for peace were often mentioned in
conjuction with re-opening Jerusalem, and helped promote the
theme of wanting peace in the Middle East:
In the context of peace, Jerusalem could
become an open city -- a meeting place for the




" 30 Mar. 72, p. 1, c. 2.)
Hussein repeatedly stated that he was willing to
negotiate with Israel in order to obtain a peaceful
settlement:
King Hussein of Jordan said today that the
chances for a lasting peace in the Middle East
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had risen considerably in recent months and he
called upon Israel to take up his offer to
begin negotiations with Jordan through the
United States. "I believe there could be a
real peace in the area ..." ("Hussein Sees
. . .
," 15 Mar. 74, p. 9, c. 1.
)
5 . Jordan is Mi litant and B elligeren t
This theme almost exlusively occurred during the 1967
war and the period of rapprochement Jordan had with the
Palestinians in 1968, in which it was (along with supporting
terrorism) the most frequent theme. As preparations were
made by the Arabs prior to the 1967 war, Jordan made the
appropriate sounds and movements to indicate that it was
ready for war:
The Government has given permission for
Iraqi and Saudi Arabian forces to enter Jordan
- . . general mobilization in Jordan had been
completed and all military units were deployed
according to plan. ("Jordan Will . . .," 25
Mar. 67, p. 17, c. 2.)
In 1968, there were frequent clashes between Israel and
Jordan. The unfavorable image that was presented owed
primarily to the dominance of the belligerent theme. Israel
used every opportunity to emphasize this unfavorable image:
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According to Israeli military spokesmen,
the Jordanians poured artillery shells into
settlements along the west bank, of the river
south of the Sea of Galilee. ("Israel and
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Syria accounted for 7.2% (174 out of 2,401) of all cases
in the study. Syria was the most frequent referrent in
1974, due to its role in the Middle East peace negotiations
that iollowed the October 1973 war. The distribution of
cases by year for Syria is shown in Figure 15.
The image ratings for Syria were: (1) favoraole 10.9%,
(2) neutral 36.2% and (3) unfavorable 52.9%. This rating,
while not the worst, has been constant ever the period,
showing nc improvement.
The five most frequent themes were all unfavorable: (1)
militant and belligerent (12.6%), (2) are or support
terrorists (9.8%), (3) unyielding and uncooperative (6.9%),
(4) anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet (5.2%) and (5) defective
military (4 . 0%) .
Syrian belligerence, support for the Palestinian
guerrillas, intransigence in negotiating positions and
strong alliance with the Soviet Union have created a
strongly unfavorable image that has persisted throughout the
period. The most frequent favorable theme — ' Syrians are
realistic or moderate — occurred only six times. While the
role that Syria played in the last stages of Lebanon's civil
war may have helped to improve this image, it would not have
been a significant improvement and was not measured as it




Americans do not have a favorable image of the Syrians.
The majority of Syria's cases were unfavorable and its
rating overall was below the aggregate ratings. The image
category summary is shown in the table below.
************************************************************
Syrian I mage Categories (Perc entage)
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Syria Total 10.9 36.2 52.9
Study Total 13.2 35.2 51 .6
Syria 1967 0.0 17.4 12.
6
Syria 1975 0.0 16.7 83.3
************************************************************
As opposed to the Egyptian and Jordanian cases, Syria's
image category ratings did not improve over the period.
Although there were years which were better than others,
Americans had just as bad an image of Syria in 1975 as they




Each of Syria's five most frequent themes was
unfavorable, and will be discussed in turn. Figure 17 is a
crosstabulation showing all themes by year.
1 • Syrians Are Militant and Belliger ent
Concentrated (90+X) in 1967, 1970, and 1974, this was
the most frequent Syrian theme, accounting for 12.6% of all
its cases. In May 1967, the Syrians were very open about
their preparations for war, creating a belligerent image:
In recent weeks, it is said, the Syrians
have massed about 30,000 men along the
frontier [Golan]. If war erupts on the
Egyptian border, Syria has promised tc join in
. . ("On One Side . . , " 30 May 67, p. 3,
c. 4. )
The image of belligerence on Syria's part was reinforced
by its disregard for cease-fires and its attacks on civilian
villages
:
Israeli armored and • infantry forces
smashed deep into Syria today after the
Syrians, according to Israel, had broken the
cease-fire on the northern front and shelled
16 settlements along the 48 mile frontier.






Although Syrian forces were not directly involved in the
War of Attrition in 1970, their military operations kept
Israel on its toes and also pointed to Syria's militant
stance. In late January, a lone Syrian MIG-21 penetrated
Israeli air space, broke the sound barrier over Haifa,
breaking windows, and returned to Syria without firing a
shot:
The enemy incursion was the first of its
kind since the Arab -- Israeli war of June,
1967. It appeared intended to provide Israeli
military chiefs with the lesson they have been
trying to teach Arab capitals: that they are
vulnerable. ("Syrian MIG-21 . . .," 30 Jan.
70, p. 1 , c. 2.)
While the emphasis was placed on a disengagement between
Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai after the October
war, the Syrians in early 1974 were citing Israeli
intransigence on the Golan Heights issue as justification
for their militant actions:
Militants in the Syrian leadership have
cited Israeli determination to retain the
Golan Heights as their argument against
agreeing to a disengagement agreement.
A sizeable number of hard liners in the
military-dominated leadership . . . favor
another battlefield assault against Israel.
("Top Arabs . . .," 10 Feb. 74, p. 16, c. 4.)
Strong talk was followed by strong action as Syria began
36

an intense and regular shelling ol Israeli positions on the
Golan
:
. President Hafez al-Assad is anxious to
demonstrate to the rest of the Arab world
Syria's militancy, especially at a time when
he is seeking the support of Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and other states for his hard line stand
on a full Israeli withdrawal. {"In Golan .
.
," 20 Feb. 74, p . 8, c. 3.)
Although the Syrian operations were not dramatically
successful, they served the purpose of reminding Syrians as
well as Israel that Syria was ready for a battle at any time
and further supported the belligerent image:
The gunfire along the front ... is meant
mainly to keep the Israelis in a tense state
of alertness and to prevent Syrians from
getting any impression that their army has
allowed a stalemate to settle ever the
cease-fire lines. ("Harrassment Seen . . .,"
15 Mar. 74, p. 8, c. 2.)
2 • Syrians Are or Support T errorists
This theme was predominantly found in the years 1967,
1972 and 1973. Accounting for 9.8& of all Syrian cases, it
was the dominant theme in 1973. Support for commando
operations was uniform throughout the period. There were





Early in 1967, Syria made clear its support for the
guerrilla operations:
The Damascus Radio . . . pledged continued
backing for infiltrators who have sabotaged
Israeli border settlement s. ("Israel
Impatient . .
.
," 5 Feb. 67, p. 28, c. 1.)
As the June war approached, border crossings from Syria
increased in number and boldness:
Border terrorists infiltrated five miles
into Israel last night and set off an
explosive charge as a military vehicle was
passing the main highway north of the Sea of
Galilee.
Military observers said it was cne of the
most daring acts in two years of border
terrorism. An Israeli spokesman said the
terrorists had apparently come from Syria.
("Terrorists Strike . . .," 10 May 67, p. 6,
c. 3. )
As guerrilla activity continued from Syria, Israel conducted





. . . the planes had attacked "concentrations
of terrorists" north of Dera . . . The raid
was described as a response to increased
guerrilla activity from Syria. ("Israeli Jets
. . . ," 25 Jan. 72, p . 10 , c. 1 .)
. . a senior officer on the Israeli General
Staff warned that Syria could expect more
strikes unless she prevented the fedayeen, or
Palestinian guerrillas from initiating raids
from Syrian territory. ("Israeli Jets . . . ,"
10 Nov. 7 2, p. 1, c. 5.)
3y 1973 the guerrilla organization as-Saiqa
(thunderbolt) had been publicly connected with the Syrian
Government:
A guerrilla wearing the uniform of As
Saiga, a Palestinian resistance group based in
Syria and supported by the government there,
said near the border yesterday that there now
were several thousand guerrillas in the border
area . . . ("Guerrilla Forces . . .," 10 May
73, p. 1 , c . 1
.
)
If Israeli retalliation had an effect on Syria's support for
the guerrillas, it was not the one intended:
Lieut. Gen. Hafez al-Assad, the President
of Syria, today repeated his determination to
support Palestinian guerrillas and to provide
them with sanctuary in spire of Israeli
threats and reprisals. ("Continued Guerrilla
. . .," 10 Jun. 73, p. 8, c. 1.)
sy

3 • Syrians Are Unyielding and Uncoope ra tiv e
This theme occurred most frequently during the last
three years of the study and is primarily due to the
hard-line attitude Syria took in the post-73 war
disengagement and peace negotiations. The theme accounted
for 6.S^i of all Syrian cases.
In December, 1973, plans were made to hold a Geneva
conference to discuss a possible Middle East settlement.
Syria made its view of the idea known:
Syria has also been invited to participate in
the conference but a government statement
issued in Damascus yesterday said it would not
attend on the gound that the conference was
designed to "serve Israeli interests."
("Mideast Parley . . .," 20 Dec. 73, p. 16, c.
4.)
Syrian unwillingness to negotiate any kind of agreement
with Israel was maintained despite the heavy internal
problems the inflexible position helped to create:
A heavy burden of refugees from wars
against Israel is straining Syria, among the
most intransigent of the Arab countries, as
the military' dominated leadership hesitates
and debates whether to take a first step to
peace with Israel through a separation of
their forces. ("Refugee Eurden . . .," 15
Feb. 74, p. 3, c. 2.)
90

As Secretary Kissinger prepared for negotiations between
Israel and Syria, the Arab nation was again characterized as
unyielding in its view toward Israel:
Since 1948, the Syrians, often
characterized as enigmatic, have been the most
militant of the Arab countries in refusing to
acknowledge the existence or Israel.
. .
there has been a strong attitude in
the military-dominated leadership against all
compromises . . . ("Syrians and Israelis . .
.
," 25 Feb. 74, p. 6, c. 1.)
A year later, as the shuttle diplomacy cf Mr. Kissinger
had produced few results on the Syrian front, that country
again signalled its uncooperative attitude:
It was reported a few days ago that the
Syrians, apparently believing they had nothing
to gain from Israel comparable to what Egypt
could expect, had sent officials to Arab
countries urging an end to the step-by-step
diplomacy. ("Kissinger Ends . . .," 20 Feb.
75, p. 3, c. 1
.
)
Later in 1975, Syria seemed to close the door en any
hopes for a Golan settlement similar to the Sinai accord:
Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria said
today that Damascus rejected negotiations on
Golan.
"Reports about bilateral or multilateral
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talks are not true," he told newsmen. "We
have asked no one for such talks and we will
never ask. We do not agree to hold talks on
Golan." ("Syria Ears . . .," 25 Sep. 75, p.
7, c. 1.)
4 • S^r_ia. Is Anti- U.S. or Pro-Soviet
This theme occurred predominantly in 1972 and 1974 and
accounted for 5.2/5 of the Syrian cases. Close Soviet ties
in 1972 and 1974 were the sources of the perceptions.
An arms deal in May of 1972 between Syria and the Soviet
Union, suggested Syrian dependence.
. . . the new military agreements strengthen
Syrian-Soviet relations and would be expected
to make Damascus more dependent en Soviet
assistance. ("Soviet Sign . . .," 15 May 72,
p . 2, c. 4.)
Later that year, it became clear that the Soviets were
providing mora than just aguipment to the Syrians:
There have been unofficial reports that
the Soviet SAM-3's have been recently added to
Syria's arsenal. They also pictured a
stiffening of Syria's air defenses, which have









After the October 1973 war and during the peace
negotiating that followed, Moscow expressed its support for
the Arabs in general but made special referrence to Syria:
Moscow not only affirmed solidarity with
the Arab states but pledged steadfast
willingness to "render assistance to
reinforcing Syria's defense capability."
("French Say . . .," 15 Mar. 74, p. 8, c. 4.)
5 • Syri a ' s Military is Def ective
Accounting for 4.0% of the Syrian cases, this theme
occurred almost exclusively in 1967 and 1973. In each of
those years there were three cases in which the theme was
dominant:. There was only one occurrence of the effective
military theme in those years.
The defective military theme included such
characteristics as being corrupt and plotting against the
government as well as battlefield ineptitude. In the
aftermath of the 1967 war, Syria, while using a planned coup
attempt by some military officers as an excuse for attacking
the United States, pointed up an unfavorable image of their
Military
:
Two Syrian Army officers pleaded guilty
today of having planned to overthrow the
Syrian government and declared that the United
States was the "chief architect of the plot




The plotting military characteristic cf the defective
theme was repeated in Syria in 1973:
The Syrian secret police have executed 42
army officers following an abortive attempt in
July to assassinate President Hafez al-Assad.
Syrian informants said that about 60
officers had disappeared after having been
arrested by the secret police, headed by
President Assad's brother, Col. Rifat
al-Assad. ("Executions in Syria . . .," 30
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Lebanon's 144 cases accounted for 6% of the study total.
Forty of these cases (27.8%) occurred in 1975, related, of
course, to the civil war that had broken out. Figure 13
shows the cases by year for Lebanon.
The image ratings for Lebanon were: (1) favorable 11.1%,
(2) neutral 28.5% and (3) unfavorable 60.4%. The trend over
the period was toward a more unfavorable image, and the
Lebanon ratings were more unfavorable than the aggregate
results.
The five most freguent themes included one favorable
theme: (1) are or support terrorists (20.1%), (2)
factionated and disunited (17.4%), (3) defective government
(16.0%), (4) anti-terrorist/extremist (4.2%) and (5)
defective military (2.8%).
Although there was a favorable theme in the five most
freguent, the dominance of the first three was so complete
(53.5% of all Lebanon cases) , that the image of Lebanon
remains strongly unfavorable. The confessional political
system of Lebanon has simply been unable to handle the
pressures that the combination of Palestinians, the normal





The American image of Lebanon is net a good one.
Lebanon had the second highest unfavorable rating of the
major national actors and the third lowest favorable rating.
The Lenanon ratings were poorer than the aggregate ratings
as shown in the table below.
************************************************************
Lebano n Image Ca teg ories (Percentage)
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Lebanon Total 1 1.1 28.5 60.4
Study Total 13.2 35.2 51.6
Lebanon 1967 1 0.0 0.0 100.0
Lebanon 1975 7.5 15.0 77.5
'one case only
******************************************** ****** **********




Of the five most frequent themes found in the Lebanon
file, one is favorable, two are paired opposires and, as in
the case of Jordan, the factionated and disunited theme is
present to provide some explanation. Figure 20 depicts all
the themes as they occurred by year. Only the three most
frequent will be discussed in detail.
1 . Lebanese Are or Supp ort Terroris ts
This theme accounts for 20.1% of all the Lebanon cases
and dominates the years 1970, 1972 and 1974, in which it was
the most frequent theme. As the 1970 wave of hijackings
began, Lebanon showed its support for the perpetrator of an
earlier seizure by freeing the French hijacker of a U.S. jet
on $8 bail:
Belon was greeted by young Lebanese girls
carrying flowers when he emerged from the
magistrate's office. They said that the
flowers were in appreciation of his feeling
for the Arab cause. ("Beirut Frees . . .," 15
Jan. 70, p. 15, c. 3
.
)
Later in 1970, Israel conducted a particularly
destructive retaliatory raid into Lebanon and was condemned
by the United Nations Security Council for its actions.
Israel cited the Lebanese support for the guerrilla's
activities in defending the raid:
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Yoseh Tekoah, Israel's [O.N.]
representative declared that Israel had been
"forced to act in self-defense" and said the
raid had been directed "solely at the
concentrations of terrorism in southeast
Lebanon." He said terrorists there had been
firing on Israeli towns and villages and
causing civilian casualties. ("U.N. Council .
. ., " 20 Hay 70, p. 5, c. 1 .)
In 1972, the guerrilla activity from Lebanon increased,
as did the frequency of Israel's retaliation. Israel made
it clear that it placed the responsibility for the commando
actions on Lebanon. Said Lieut. Gen. Elazar, Israeli Chief
of Staff:
This terrorist activity arcund the
villages and from bases located within them is
liable to bring disaster upon the villages of
south Lebanon. It is our hope that the
Lebanese authorities and their army will
understand the seriousness of the matter and
do their very best to prevent such a grave




72, p . 12, c. 1 .)
As if in a belated reply the Lebanese Government stated
their position. "Premier Saeb Salaam said emphatically
today that Lebanon would not clamp down on the Palestinian
guerrillas." ("Beirut is . . .," 25 Jun. 72, p. 14, c. 4.)
Later that year Salaam met with Palestinian leader Yasir
Arafat. After the meeting Salaam left no doubt about
Lebanon's position. "Our relations with our Palestinian
brothers emanate from mutual comprehension and oneness of
103

spirit." ("Commandos Say ," 25 Sep. 72, p. 7, c. 1 .)
On 14 May 1974, Palestinian guerrillas, operating from
Lebanon, seized an Israeli school in the village of Maalot
near the Lebanese border. Taking 90 school children
hostage, the guerrillas demanded the release of imprisoned
Arab guerrillas. Israeli forces attacked the commandos,
killing them, but not before some of the students had been
killed. Israel retaliated swiftly by air, land and sea:
Israeli naval boats . . . attacked what
Israel said were Palestinian guerrilla bases
on the south coast of Lebanon in a continuing
series of punitive measures that followed the
shooting on Wednesday of students at Maalot.
("Israelis Report . . .," 20 Kay 74, p. 3, c.
5.)
2 . Lebanon Is F action ated and Disu nit ed
This theme occurred predominantly, and expectedly, in
1975 and accounted for 45% of all Lebanon's cases in that
year. In the wake of Israeli retaliatory raids for
Lebanon's support of guerrilla operations, Lebanon sought
help from its Arab neighbors. It would have been difficult
for the other Arab nations to render assistance, had they
wanted to because of the division of interests in Lebanon:
Lebanon has called for an urgent meeting
of the Arab League Defense Council next
Tuesday to consider Israeli raids into
southern Lebanon, but Lebanese political
forces are divided over what form of help
should be sought. ("Lebanon Calls . . .," 3C
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Jan. 75, p . 2 , c. 4 .
)
As the fighting between what was at first described as
the left and right in Lebanon heated up, Bashid Karami, a
perenniel Lebanese political actor, was appointed Premier,
for the second time, with the task of ending the fighting
between the two factions:
The basis of Mr. Karami's problem is a
stand-off between the conservative Phalangist
party, which claims to speak for the country's
large Maronite Christian population, and an
important left-of-cent er leader, Kamal
Jumblatt, of the Moslem Druze sect.




The source of the deep split in Lebanese society is
rooted in centuries of history, but this most recent
outburst arose from Muslim desire to amend the confessional
political system which had been established in 1943:
the left has oeen demanding
secularization of Lebanon's political life,
where top positions are strictly allocated
according to religious affiliation, as well as
greater opportunity for impoverished groups,
which tend to be Moslem.
On the right, the Phalangists are the most
militant defenders of the status quo and of
the leading role assigned to the Maronite
Christian community in a political compact
reached in 1943. ("Syrians Seek . . .," 20
Sep. 75, p. 3 , c. 5.
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All efforts at ending the fighting seemed doomed in the
fall of 1975. An embattled Karami began an appeal for help
from Syria — the beginning of the end for the Muslim left
and Palestinian coalition:
Christian and Moslem gunmen battled
through the day here yesterday as Premier
Rashid Karami sought help in neighboring Syria
to end the six month Lebanese crisis.
("Lebanese Premier
c. 1 . )
10 Oct 75, p. 1,
3 • Leba non Ha s a Defe ct, ive Government
Occurring in 1 6% of the Lebanon cases, this theme was
found most frequently in 1969 and 1975. It was the dominant
theme in 1969, and it includes characteristics such as
unstable and incapable in Lebanon's case.
Civil unrest early in 1969 over Lebanon's inability to
prevent Israeli retaliatory raids, universal conscription
and restriction on commando organizations put pressure on
the always fragile Lebanese Government. By April of that
year, rioting threatened to force the collapse of Premier
Karami's coalition:
He presented his resignation after
speeches oy two former premiers, Abdullah
Yaffi and Saab Salaam, whose constituencies
are in the center of the riot area in Beirut.
("Lebanon Premier . . .," 25 Apr. 69, p. 1, c.
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The defective government theme is tied to the
factionated and disunited theme, because of the religious
split within the government. As established in 1943, the
President is to be a Christian and the Premier a Sunni
Muslim. That the religious factions were on opposite sides
of the Palestinian guestion disabled the government.:
The Lebanese crisis arose from a conflict
between President Charles Helou and Premier
Rasnid Karami over the government's restraints
over Palestinian guerrillas wishing to attack




" 30 Apr. 69, p. 4, c. 5.)
In the spring of 1975, the Government of Lebanon seemed
incapable of maintaining even rudimentary control over the
fighting in the country, which further accentuated the split
between the two religious groups:
After the cease-fire in the fighting this
week, indecisive action by the Government's
security forces against trouble-makers in the
country's diverse political factions stirred
demands in the press and in economic groups
for a new cabinet to replace the badly divided
Government of Premier Solh.
A persistent problem in Lebanon is an
inaoility to form a strong government because
of intense rivalries among political leaders
representing the different religious, ethnic
and economic interests in the country, roughly
half Moslem and half Christian. ("Lebanese
bnaxen <:0 Apr. 75, 1.)
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The instability in Beirut caused ripple effects
throughout the Arab world and threatened the peace that had
just seemed to settle on the region. A Times editorial
spoke of the implications:
If the Arabs cannot maintain order among
themselves in Beirut, one of the most advanced
of Arab countries, instability in Lebanon can
only strengthen the hawks in Jerusalem who
counsel against trusting any Arab government's
word and against taking risks in the effort to
secure Arab-Israeli peace. ("The Tremors .
.
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The 88 cases in which Iraq was the referrent accounted
for 3.7% of all cases. Nineteen of these cases (21.6%)
occurred in 1969 when Iraq had seme acute internal stability
problems. Figure 21 shows the frequency of the Iraq cases
by year.
The image ratings for Iraq were: (1) favorable 11.1%,
(2) neutral 22.7% and (3) unfavorable 65.9%. Iraq's
unfavorable rating is the highest of the national
referrents, and the ratings were more unfavorable than the
aggregate results.
The five most frequent themes were all unfavorable and
included: (1) defective government {21.6%), (2)
anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet (13.6%), (3) militant and
belligerent (9.1%), (4) unreliable and bellicose (4.5%)
and (5) oil/economic blackmailers (3.4%).
The highly unfavorable image category rating Iraq
received is mitigated by only ten favorable cases in the
nine-year period, with no more than two favorable cases in
any year. The dominance of the defective government theme
combined with the consistency of the anti-U.S. or pro-Soviet
and the militant and belligerent theme, make for a durable




American images of Iraq are the most unfavorable of all
major national referrents. Iraq's unfavorable rating was
the highest of the national referrents and it's favorable
rating was third lowest. A summary of Iraq's image category
ratings is shown in the table below.
























The most frequent themes in Iraq's cases are
unfavorable. In Iraq, however, these unfavorable themes are
more evenly distributed over the nine years than was the
case with the previous referrents. Figure 23 is a
crosstabulation of the Iraqi themes by year. Only the three
most frequent themes will be discussed in detail.
1 • i£S3 Has a D efect ive Gov ernment
This theme includes characteristics such as unstable,
incapable, radical, corrupt, repressive and extremist. It
was the dominant theme in 1969 and 1973.
In January, 1969, the Government arrested a grcup of
Iraqi citizens on espionage charges. They were later
executed. The group included at least four Iraqi Jews. The
United States protested this repressive and extreme action
at the United Nations:
The Government of the United States
recognizes the legal right of any Government
to bring to trial and administer justice to
any of its citizens. However, the manner in
which these executions and the trials that
proceeded them were conducted scarcely
conforms to normally accepted standards of
respect for human dignity or -co the obligation
in this regard that the United Nations Charter
imposes upon all members. ("Hangings by . .
.




Some observers felt that the many arrests and trials
were "circuses" provided by a shakey Iraqi Government to
divert the attention of the people from their more basic
problems
:
The current wave of arrests and show
trials in Iraq is interpreted by qualified
Western specialists here as an outgrowth of
the extreme instability and insecurity of




" 30 Jan. 69, p. 3, c. 1.)
Another characteristic of the defective government theme
which was evidenced in the Iraqi cases was that of
instability. Coups and attempted coups were not uncommon:
Iraq's former chief of public security had
planned in a coup Saturday to seize or
assassinate President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and
Vice-President Saddam Hussein with the goal of
taking power in Baghdad . . . ("Delaying of .
. .,"5 Jul . 73, p. 5, c. 1.)
The crackdown which occurred as a result of the
above-cited coup attempt went beyond the trial and execution
of the 13 people who were accused of taking part in it:
President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr of Iraq, in
a move seen as further evidence of the power
struggle involving an attempted coupt two
weeks ago, has ammended the country's




General Bakr, a 61-year-old former
infantry officer, becomes head of state,
Premier and Commander in Chief of the armed
forces.
He has power to appoint or dismiss every
official from the vice president down.
("President Bakr . . .," 15 Jul. 73, p. 14, c.
1.)
2 • Iraq Is Anti-U ,S. or Pro-Sov iet
Accounting for 13.6% of Iraq's cases, this theme is
evenly distributed over the entire period, reflecting tne
consistently close Iraqi-U . S . S. R . relations. It was the
most frequent theme in 1972.
In Apri'l, 1972,. the announcement of a 15-year Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and
Iraq, made official what had been in existence for years.
President al-Bakr, "... hailed the Soviet Union as a 'true
friend of the Arabs."' ("Soviet and Iraq . . .," 10 Apr.
72, p. 3, c. 1
.)
Iraq also lashed out at the United States for its
support of Israel:
. . . he [ Iraqi Foreign Minister ] asserted
that "the United States is still acting
irresponsibly and contrary to its alledged
intentions by providing the Zionist usurpers
with enormous amounts of arms and huge sums of
money in addition to political support in all




Early in 1975, the Beirut paper, An N aha r, announced
that Iraq and the Soviet Union had concluded the biggest
arms deal ever between the two countries. The only details
reported by An Naha r were that "Moscow had agreed to supply
Iraq with advanced artillery of all calibers." ("Iraq
Executes . . .," 20 Jan. 75, p. 12, c. 3.)
3 • I rag Is Mi litant and Bel ligerent
As with the anti-O.S, or pro-Soviet theme, this theme is
also distributed evenly throughout the study. In the fall
and winter of 1968 the Iraqis, operating in Jordan, were
regularly shelling Israeli settlements across the Jordan
River
:
By mid-October the Iraqis were shelling
two or three Israeli settlements as part of
regular Jordanian attacks, the Israelis said,
but last week began operating on their own.
On Monday night Iraqi 122mm guns opened up
on Israeli settlements . . . ("Iraqi Positions
. . .
," 5 Dec. 68, p. 1, c. 8.)
In June, 1970, President al-Bakr submitted a plan to the
aeads of the so-called confrontation states at a June
meeting in Libya:
The Iraqi radio reported that the plan
would have set the time for an Arab offensive
against Israel, and its purpose would have
been to conquer not only the Aran territory
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that Israel occupied in the 1967 war but also
Israel herself. (untitled, 10 Aug. 70, p. 3,
c. 2.)
Iraq did not direct all its belligerence at Israel.
There was an on-again, off-again border feud with Iran that
was on-again in early 1975:
An attack. by Iraqi forces on Iranian
frontier posts has been repelled . . .
The past month has seen an intensification
of a propaganda campaign Iraq has been waging
against Iran. ("Iran Says . . .," 10 Feb. 75,
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Saudi Arabia's low case count (79 for 3.3% of the total)
belies the important role that this country has played in
the Middle East. Saudi Arabia's emergence as a dominant
force began in late 1973 and continued through the remainder
of the period studied. The years 1973 tnrough 1975 account
for almost 85% of the Saudi case total. In those three
years Saudi Arabia was the third most frequently encountered
national referrent. Figure 24 shows the Saudi cases by
year.
The image ratings for Saudi Arabia were: (1) favorable
21.5%, (2) neutral 51.9% and (3) unfavorable 26.6%. These
ratings place Saudi Arabia as one of tne twc most favorably
regarded Arab states.
The five most frequent themes were: (1) oil/eccnomic
blackmailer (19.0%), (2) progressive, reforming,
modernizing (10.1%), (3) pro-U.S. (5.1%), (4) realistic,
moderate (5.1%) and (5) unreliable, bellicose (2.5%).
It is clear that the oil embargo has had an adverse
impact en the American image of Saudi Arabia. It
overshadows those favorable images that no ether Arab actor
generated. Yet, it would seem impossible to separate the
bad from the good without taking away the good. Many of
Saudi Arabia's actions that created the favorable
impressions are so inextricably linked to its oil wealth,
that without it, Saudi Arabia would be unable to influence
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its more militant Arab neighbors.
Here again, there is a potential for dysfunction. The
pro-U.S. image is nebulous. Not rooted in ideological
similarities, it seems to be based on a rather cool,
systematic appraisal of economic reality. An awareness of
this possible dysfunction on the part of the United States
will prevent the "unexpected results" that might accrue from
a less "real" interpretation.
IMAGE CATEGORIES
Next to Jordan, Americans have a better image of Saudi
Arabia than they do of any other major national Arab actor.
Saudi Arabia has the second highest favorable rating and the
lowest unfavorable raring of the national referrents. The
table below summarizes the Saudi image category ratings.




Saudi Arabia Image Cat egories (Perc enta ge)
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Saudi Arabia Total 21.5 51 .9 26.6
Study Total 13.2 35.2 51.6
Saudi Arabia 1967* 100.0 0.0 0.0
Saudi Arabia 1 975 40.0 45.0 15.0
1 one case only
************************************************** **********
B. THEMES
Three of the four most frequent themes fcr Saudi Arabia
are favorable. However, the most frequent theme, that of
oil/economic blackmail, so dominates, that it mitigates the
favorable image of the other three. All four of these
themes are concentrated in the 1973 to 1975 period. Figure
26 shows the Saudi Arabian themes by year.
1. Saudi Arabia Is an Oil Blackmailer
Although the oil embargo did not begin until after tne
1973 war, Saudi Arabia had specifically linked continued
127

U.S. oil tc a political settlement in the Middle East
earlier that year:
Saudi Arabia's Minister of Petroleum has
told Secretary of State William P. Rogers that
his country would find it difficult to
increase oil production if the United States
did not help to bring about a political
settlement in the Middle East satisfactory tc
Arab states . . . ("Oil for U.S. . . . , " 20
Apr. 73, p. 7, c. 1
.
)
When the embargo was imposed, the Saudis left no doubt
as to what they wanted to restore the flow:
Mr. Kissinger was told by King Faisal
and other Saudi officials that oil production
cuts imposed since Oct. 17 would not be
relaxed until there was a physical withdrawal
of Israeli forces from Arab land occupied
during the 1967 war.
The political calculations of the Arabs
were that the outbreak of war, involving the
Soviet Union in support of Egypt and Syria,
and the crisis produced in industrial
countries by oil production cutbacks would
generate enough alarm in western countries to
put pressure on Israel to withdraw from
occupied Arab lands. ("Kissinger Fails
.
, " 10 Nov. 73, p. 1 , c. 1
.)
As consumer nations proposed various strategies to
counter the oil embargo, Saudi Arabia warned that any such
actions would result in further reductions in production:

Sheik al-Yamani also said that if the
oil-buying nations established a collective
purchasing organization the result would be
less Arab oil at higher prices. ("Saudi Says
. . .," 10 May 74, p. 53, c. 1.)
By mid-1 S74, O.P.E.C. as a whole, rather than just Saudi
Arabia, was playing a more noticeable role in the embargo.
An editorial reminded Americans of the Saudi responsibility:
Whether the Saudis have or have not done
enough to bring down oil prices -- it must be
remembered that they master-minded the
original oil embargo that opened the way to
quadrupling of the world price
("Parrying . . .," 20 Jun. 74, p. 38, c. 1.)
2 . Saudi Arabia Is Prog res sive
This theme accounted for 10.1% of all the Saudi cases
and occurred predominantly in 1975. It is interesting to
note that it was after a full year of revenue from the
higner cil prices, that this emerged as an important theme.
Following the assassination of King Faisal, Khalid
instituted seme reforms that created favoratle images in the
United States:
Highly placed sources said that a decree
had teen prepared to create a legislative
assembly for the first time in Saudi Arabia.
The move . . . was being prepared by King
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Faisal before his death, and is regarded as a
way of modernizing governmental organization.
("Saudi King . . .," 30 Mar. 75, p. 9, c. 1.)
The Saudis were not people to sit on their money. Their
plans were impressive:
If the plan is carried out, 8,500 miles of
highway will te built, 200,000 housing units
constructed and 2,000 miles of electricity
lines will take power to all large towns.
Education will be expanded so that the present
primary school enrollment of 600,000 will rise
to a million. University roles will rise from
12,000 to 31,200. ("Saudis Plan . . .," 25
Hay 75, Sec. 4, p. 4, c. 3.)
3 . Saudi Arabia Is Pro-U.S.
Saudi Arabia is the only major Arab referrent in whicn
this theme is in the most frequent group. It accounts for
5.1% of the Saudi cases (the next highest percentage is 1.5%
for Egypt) . However, there are still only four occurrences
over the entire period, and three of those were in 1974.
Once the Saudis had initiated the oil embargo, they
tried to insure that price hikes did Dot (by their
definition, at least) go beyond what the market could bear.
Iheir efforts at holding down prices created the image of
concern for the interests of the United States:
. . . on the major issues of the embargo and
oil prices decided here [Vienna], Saudi Arabia
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virtually imposed conditions that were closely
in line with American desires. ("Saudis Said
. . .," 20 Mar. 74, p. 26, c. 1.)
During the negotiations between Syria, Israel and
Secretary Kissinger, attempting to secure a disengagement on
the Syrian front, Saudi Arabia lent strong support:
Secretary of State Kissinger flew to the
Egyptian capital tonight after receiving a
strong endorsement from Saudi Arabia for his
efforts to bring about a troop separation
agreement between Syria and Israel.
("Kissinger Wins . . .," 10 May 74, p. 9, c.
1-)
4 . Saudi Arabia Is Real ist ic, Mod era te
This theme also occurred in 5.1% of the Saudi cases. It
appeared exclusively in 1974 and 1975.
Mixed with the pro-U.S. theme, one characteristic of
this theme had to do with the Saudi role in moderating other
O.P.E.C. nations' stands on oil prices:
Sheik Yamani said King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia would send personal letters to six
Persian Gulf oil-producing countries in an
effort to persuade them to cut oil prices.




We don't want to repeat what happened in
Tehran at the end of 1973.
We think that was wrong, and if there is
any increase in oil prices it has to be a
small portion, step by step, very gradual,
which could be absorbed by your [U.S.]
economy. ("Zaki Sees . .
.
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Libya accounted for only 2.7% of all cases. These
occurred predominantly in 1969 and 1970 after the Qaddaffi
regime had taken power, and in 1973. Figure 27 shows the
Libyan case frequency by year.
The image ratings for Libya were: (1) favorable 7.8%,
(2) neutral 37.5% and (3) unfavorable 54.7%. Lioya had tae
lowest favorable rating of all major national actors in tae
study.
The five most frequent themes were: (1) oil/eccnomic
blackmail (15.6%), (2) militant and belligerent (7.8%),
(3) are or support terrorists (6.3%) , (4) defective
government (6.3%) and (5) anti-U.S., pro-Soviet (4.7%).
While other national actors such as Jordan and Egypt
improved the images they presented to Americans, Libya
reversed the process. The demise of the Idris monarchy
marked the beginning of a down-swing in American images of
Libya. middle East watchers would do well to keep the
Libyan example in mind when thinking of Saudi Arabia and
Jordan and the importance of the monarchy in those two
countries who have been closest to the west and the United
States. Figure 28 compares the image ratings for the pre




In additon to having the lowest favorable rating cf all
major national actors, Libya's unfavorable rating was the
third highest. As noted in the synopsis, the turning point
in Libya's image ratings occurred in 1969, with subsequent
ratings being consistently unfavorable. A crosstabulation
of the image ratings by year appears at Figure 29. They are
summarized in the table below.
Libyan Ima ge Cat egories (Percentage)



















The four most frequent themes, discussed below, are
unfavorable and account for 36% of the Libyan total. A
theme by year crosstabulation is at Figure 30.
1 • kiz£.l& £§ §J3 Oil/Economic Black mailer
After Colonel Qaddaffi gained power in Libya in
September 1969, he began to apply pressure to the western
oil firms which were operating in Libya:
Western oil companies waited anxiously
today for the Libyan Government's decision on
the companies' offer of a substantial increase
in tax and royalty payments.
The Government had warned of "drastic
action" unless the companies accept Government
demands by tomorrow. ("West's Oilmen . . .,"
1 Mar. 71, p. 11, c. 1.)
Libya did not hesitate to translate its words
action when it found an opportunity:
into
Libya has said that the nationalization of
the assets of the Eritish Petroleum Company
and the fund withdrawal were retaliations for
alleged British "collusion" with Iran in the
latter's occupation last week of three islands
in the Persian Gulf. ("Libyan Premier . . .,"
10 Dec. 71
,




Prior to the October 1973 war and the Saudi Arabian
sponsored oil embargo that followed, Libya made it known
that U. S. support for Israel would be costly:
. . . Libya nationalized the entire operation
of the independent oilman. Nelson Bunker Hunt,
. . . without compensation on the grounds that
the United States supported Israel.
The Libyans have let it be known that they
are more than willing to sell their oil
directly to Europe and Japan, bypassing the
American companies. ("Oilmen Set . . .," 5
Sep. 73, p. 5 1, c. 1
.
)
Once the emoargo had begun, Libya joined in with no
reservations:
Libya fired a dcuble-barr el blast of her
"oil weapon" yesterday by ordering a cutoff of
all shipments of crude oil and petroleum
products to the United States and almost
doubling prices for other importers. ("Cutoff
in Oil . . .," 20 Oct. 73, p. 1, c. 1.)
2 • Libya Is M ilitant and Be lli qer ent
Qaddaffi's Nasser-style Revolutionary Council was not
long in sounding a militant note in demanding the evacuation
of Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli:
The leader of the ruling Revolutionary
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Council says Libya will go to war if "colonial
states" do not agree to a complete withdrawal
of forces from the country. ("Libyan Leader .
. .," 5 Nov. 69, p. 5, c. 6.)
A proposed merger of Libya and Egypt was thwarted, in
part, by Libyan belligerence over Israel:
Unlike Egypt.' s proclaimed "total
confrontation" with Israel while at the same
rime pursuing diplomatic solutions, Colonel
Qaddafi rejects all measures short of war.




One of Colonel Qaddaffi's goals has been to spread the
Muslim faith. The Libyans manage to sound belligerent even
in this -endeavor:
While there exists no known incidents in
drives for conversions, Libyan leader Col.
Uuammar el-Qaddafi, has promised to help
Moslem rebels fighting central governments
dominated by Christians . . . ("Licya is . .
. ," 5 Oct. 75, p. 18, c. 4.)
3 • liJ2.Y.ans Ar e or Supp ort T errori sts
On 30 October 1972, Palestinians hijacked a Lufthansa
airliner in Beirut and flew it first to Yugoslavia. They
were aoie to secure the release of the surviving Black
September guerrillas from the Olympic games tragedy:
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the hijackers and the three released
Munich killers took refuge in Libya . . .
. . . Libya provides the training and
financing for much of the guerrilla novenient.
("The Timing . . .," 5 Nov. 72, Sec. 4, p. 3,
c. 3.)
When unable to render some form of physical support for
the commando's, Libya provided moral support:
But he [Qaddaffi] praised the guerrilla
attack on the Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona
last Thursday. "This operation is long
overdue . . . " ("Libya's Premier . . .," 15
Apr. 74, p. 10, c. 4.)
4 • Li.kZ§ M.§. § Defect ive Government
When the United States announced that despite the change
in government in Libya, it was going ahead with plans to
sell F-5's to Libya, there were many objections. Senator
Adlai Stevenson described the Qaddaffi regime as ". . .
militaristic, communist, belligerent, radical and hostile to
the United States." ("Stevenson Criticizes . . .," 20 Mar.
70, p. 3, c. 6.)
Though not overtly oppressive by Iraqi standards, the
xenophobic character of the Qaddaffi regime was clear to the
Americans that lived in Libya:
It has never been a gaudy place like Beirut,
but the austere puritanisn of the young ruling
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officers has depressed foreigners even more.
Prohibition has been decreed. Casinos and
some theaters and restaurants have been
closed. Foreign-language signs at the airport
and in the city have been removed and only
Arabic is to be seen. The old Italian
community has been expelled. ("Strict
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XII. OTHER ARAB NATIONS
SYNOPSIS
This group includes in descending frequency: South
Yemen, Kuwait, Yemen, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Oman
and Bahrain. Together they account for 4.2% of the study
total. The frequencies per year for each are shown in
Figure 31. The 1967 and 1968 occurrences were dominated by
Yemen and South Yemen, whose unfavorable ratings were 68. 2%
and 11.8% respectively. The more recent occurrences came
predominantly from Kuwait which had emerged as a giant in
the world of finance. The U.A.E., Oman and 3ahrain
accounted for only 18 cases between them. The dominant
themes for the group are associated with the Yemens. They
were: (1) defective governemnts (13.7%), (2) facticnated
and disunited (12.7%) and (3) are or support terrorists
(8.8%) .
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES
Aggregate figures for this group mean very little, since
the frequencies range from a high of 36 to a low of three.
Figure 32 provides a breakdown of the images for each
referrent over the period. The highly unfavorable ratings
of Yemen and So~uth Yemen stem from a concentration of cases
in 1967 and 1968. Civil wars and insurgencies in these
countries during that time were the sources of the poor
ratings. For both countries about 80% of their total cases
occurred during these two years.
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Kuwait, on the other hand, had only three cases in the
first six years of the study. In the post-1973 war
atmosphere of Arab economic prowess, Kuwait emerged as a
financial power. Most of Kuwait's cases were found in the
financial section of the Times. Although a majority (69.2%)
of Kuwait's cases were neutral, the oil blackmail theme was
its most freguent unfavorable theme.
Very little of significance can be said about the O.A.S.
and Bahrain. Oman was characterized primarily as having a
defective government because of its problems witn the Chofar
rebel activity.
B. THEMES
The three most freguent themes were unfavorable, apply
primarily to Yemen and South Yemen and account for over 35%
of all the cases in the group. Figure 33 is a
crosstabulation of the themes as they occurred by year.
1 . Defective Go vernment
The complexion of the war between the republicans and
royalists in Yemen, with overt Egyptian military support for
the republicans and Saudi logistical support for the
royalists, changed after Egypt withdrew most of her forces
following the Six Day War of 1967:
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the latest withdrawals would — if
confirmed — suggest a far more severe
cutback, leaving the wobbly Yemeni republicans
increasingly vulnerable to overthrow by the
Yemeni royalists - . . ("U.A.R. Said . . . ,"
30 Jun. 67, p. 5, c. 1
.
)
As the republicans attempted to consolidate their
position, measures were adopted which created unfavorable
images of the Yemeni Government:
Mohsen el-Aini, the new Premier of Yemen,
declared last night that his government would
not accept or permit consultation with the
country's royalist family and would net allow
tne republican system of government to be put
to a vote. ("Yemen's Premier . . .," 10 Nov.
67, p. 9, c. 1
.
)
Although the republican regime managed tc held on to its
control of the Government, they were less capable of
maintaining crder:
Royalist tribesmen fired oazooka shells in
Sana today . . . Sana appeared to be in no
imminent danger of falling to the royalists
but it was nearly impossible to travel beyond
the city because of the guerrillas.




2 • Factionate d and Disu nit ed
In South Yemen, the battle was between the new
Government (S. Yemen achieved independence from Britain in
November, 1969) of Qahtan al-Shabi and the tribal leaders
and sultanates al-Shabi' s National Liberation Front party
was trying to eliminate. Yemeni royalists supported the
tribal forces in South Yemen:
Prince Hassan Bin Yahya, the Deputy
Premier in the regime of the royalist held
areas of Yemen, said
,
here today that the
battle for Beihan could fce the oeginning of a
widespread tribal uprising against the
National Liberation Front regime in Southern
Yemen. ("Royalists Expect . .
.
,
" 20 Feb. 63,
p. 9, c. 1.
)
In Yemen, the royalist and republican factions insured
that an unfavorable image was maintained by their battle for
political control:
In its sixth year, the war between the
republicans who overthrew Imam Mohammed
al-3adr, and the royalists who seek tc restore
him to his thrown, is entering a new phase.
Altnough narrowed militarily to a struggle for
the capital, it is broadening in the sense
that it is again involving more countries in
the Middle East and beyond. ("Royalists in
Yemen . . .," 15 Mar. 68, p. 10, c. 1.)
As it was called in 1968, Muscat and Oman also had
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internal problems with the Dhofar region of the country
which, besides wanting to secede from the federation, went
out of its way to cause other problems:
Armed revolution to overthrow the rulers
of the Persian Gulf states, one of the richest
oil-producing areas of the world, is advocated
by a newly formed organization, the National
Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf
[ previously known as the Front for the
11Liberation of Dhofar]. ("Rebel Group . .
1 Dec. 68, p. 6, c. 1
.)
3 • Are cr Su££ort Terro ris ts
Early in 1967 Great Eritain announced that it would guit
the Aden Protectorate thus enabling South Yemen's
independence. The image of the nationalists was not a good
one:
Jockeying to inherit her [Britain's]
power, Arab nationalists are trying tc spread
chaos with terrorist attacks.
"There will be no end to the bloodshed if
the nationalists wishes are not met," one
nationalist leader . . . warned last year.
("Now Its* s Trouble . .
.
,
" 15 Jan. 67, Sec.
4
, p . 3, c. 2 .
)
The Arab nationalists put increasing pressure en the




The action was interpreted as an
indication of how gravely the British
authorities regard the crisis here in the wake
of the mutiny in the Arab security forces nine
days ago and the terrorist control of the
commercial quarter known as Crater since then.
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Figure 32 - OTHER — IMAGES 3Y REFERRENT
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The Palestinians account for 9.4% of the cases in the
study and were the second most frequently occurring
referrent. Nearly one-half of the cases occurred in 1970
and 1974 due primarily to the Jordanian war and large-scale
guerrilla activity. Figure 34 shows the Palestinian case
distribution by year. The image category ratings for the
Palestinians were the worst of the major actors, with an
unfavorable rating of 77.8% and a favorable rating cf only
4.9%. The most frequent themes were unfavorable: (1) are
or support terrorists (40.9%), (2) militant and belligerent
(15.6%), (3) factionated and disunited (5.8%), (4)
anti-U.S. cr pro-Soviet (4.0%) and (5) unyielding or
uncooperative (3.6%).
This highly unfavorable image is one of the factors that
obstructs efforts to deal with the Palestinians in the
Middle East conflict. The fact that the Palestinians were
the second most frequent referrent in the study (and were
involved in many more cases which were counted for other
actors) demonstrates rather clearly that they are one cf, if
not the crucial issue that must somehow be resolved in any
"final" Middle East settlement. United States recognition of
Palestinian claims or official contacts with, for instance,
the Palestine Liberation Organization, would produce a hue
and cry from the American public. Unless such an acticn was
preceded by something to alter the American image of the
Palestinians (P.L.O. recognition of Israel's right to exist,
for example), the opposition might be prohibitive, and at
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very best would require and extensive and strong set of
assurances to the public.
A. IMAGE CATEGORIES
As one might expect, Americans do not have a favorable
image of the Palestinians. Their favorable rating is lower
than any major national referrent and their unfavorable
rating is the hightest. The neutral rating is the lowest in
the entire study. The table below summarizes the
Palestinian image ratings.
**********************************************************:;:*
Pa lestin ian Image Categor ies (Percentage)
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Palestinian Total 4.9 17.3 77.8
Study Total 13.2 35.2 51 .6
Palestinians 196 7 0. 0.0 100.0
Palestinians 1975 7.1 25.0 67.9
*******************************************:***;*=!:;;***=***:£****
Figure 35 gives the image cateogry ratings by year. It
can be seen that the 1974 and 1975 unfavorable ratings were
the lowest of the nine-year period, and that the favorable
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rating for those years, however meager, was above the
Palestinians' average, hinting at a slight improvement at
the end of the study.
B. THEMES
The five most frequent Palestinian themes were
unfavorable. The Palestinians had cases in every possible
unfavorable theme (defective government and oil blackmailers
not being possible for them) and in only five of the twelve
possible favorable themes. Figure 36 shows the themes by
year for the Palestinians.
1 • Palest inia ns Are Ter rorist s
This theme accounted for more than UQ% of the
Palestinian cases, double the next most frequent theme. It
was the only theme to occur in each year of the study.
One of the most frequent acts associated with the
Palestinians was the hijacking of airliners in order tc make
some sort of political point or to gain a concession:
Arab commandos hijacked a Trans world
Airlines jet with 113 persons aboard over
southern Italy today in what they described as
a counter-blow against the sale of Phantom jet
fighters to Israel by the United States.
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Sources close to the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine in Beirut assumed
responsibility for the hijacking . . . ("U.S.
Jet . . .," 30 Aug. 69, p. 1, c. 19)
Another tactic frequently used by the Palestinians was
kidnapping:
The United States Embassy here [Amman]
would not disclose the whereabouts today of
Morris Draper, the head of its political
section who was seized and later released last
night by Palestinian commandos. ("Where
Abouts . . .," 10 Jun. 70, p. 15, c. 1.)
Probably the most spectacular hijacking series occurred
in September 1970, when the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (P.F.L.P.) seized four airliners and took them
to an abandoned R.A.F. airfield north of Amman, holding
hundreds as hostages:
The Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, the Arab guerrilla organization
that seized three other airliners and
attempted to capture a fourth Sunday, said the
VC10 which is 170 feet long and valued at
$7-million, had been taken for use as ransom
for the return of a 24-year eld woman commando




70, p. 1 , c. 7.)
If the Dawson Field operation just described was the
most spectacular, the Munich attack by Black September was
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the most devastating. It may well have created an image of
the Palestinian which is beyond repair:
Once again, Arab guerrillas had struck
suddenly against their foes, and when the
blaze of gunfire ended at the airport outside
Munich last Tuesday, 17 lives, 11 of them
Israeli athletes, had been snuffed out.
("Another Round . .
.
,




If airplanes were not hijacked, they were attacked on
the ground, or terminals were attacked. In very few cases
were the guerrillas tried and convicted. In the case below
the commandos were subseguently released:
Two Arabs who killed five persons and
injured 55 in a grenade attack at the Athens
airport last August were sentenced to death
today after a one-day trial.
Mr. Arida said that he and his comrade had
carried out orders they had received from the
Palestinian Black September Organization.
("Greece Sentences . . .," 25 Jan. 74, p. 8,
c. 2.)
The Palestinians would offer no respite in their attacks
against "enemies," and this applied even to the prominent
holy cities during the Easter pilgrimmage. One of the most
extreme groups, the P.F.L.P. — General Command, issued this
statement in April, 1974:
We warn foreign tourists and others who
intend visiting the occupied lands that we
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shall treat them like enemies.
Following this warning, the Popular Front
General Command will accept no responsibility
for the lives of anyone on the territory of
occupied Palestine apart from Arabs.
("Palestine Guerrilla . . .," 20 Apr. 74, p.
4 , c . 3 .
)
2 • Palestinia ns Are Mil itan t
Early in 1969, Yasir Arafat established himself as the
leader of the dominant guerrilla group, Fatah. His remarks
made clear the aggressive course of action the commando
groups would follow:
Mr. Arafat promised to intensify the
"armed revolution in all parts of our
Palestinian territory tc make of it a war of
liberation. Armed struggle is the only way
.
." ("Fatah Wins . . .,"5 Feb. 69, p. 5, c.
5.)
The militant Palestinian image was supported by many
pictures of the commando and his weapon -- the Kalashnikov
rifle. Abu Omar, a leading Fatah spokesman said:
It's our symbol because we are fighting an
armed struggle, and this is our most popular
arm — I think it's pretty neat myself.




Despite losing the battle to King Hussein in Jordan in
September 1970, Arafat seemed undaunted:
It is our uncontestable right tc tear arms
in an attempt to return to our country. Our
aim is to liberate our homeland, Palestine,
from the Jordan River to the sea. ("The
Kalashnikov . . .," 30 Oct. 70, p. 41, c. 1.)
After the 1973 war, talk of peace in the Middle East
began to include the Palestinians. Not everyone felt that
the militant Palestinians would live at peace with Israel
even in their own state. Senator Jacob Javitz:
. . . a Palestinian state dominated by the
Palestine Liberation Organization is a dagger
at the heart of Israel and will greatly
endanger the peace of the world and would be
an affront to human decency. ("Javitz Charges
. . .," 20 Oct. 74, p. 56, c. 1.)
3. Palestinians Are Disunited
Though nominally linked under the umbrella of the
P.L.O., the various guerrilla groups were freguently at odds
with each other. Differences ranged from ideological to
operational:
The challenge to Mr. Arafat, the Fatah
chief, came from a commando leader, Abu Yussef
al-Khayed, whose followers rejected the
decision of the Palestinian commando
leadersnip to withdraw some forces from
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Southern Lebanon and reduce guerrilla attacks
from there on Israel. ("An Armed . . .," 20
Oct. 72, p. 2, c. 4 . )
Talks about peace in the Middle East are looked at
differently by various groups within the Palestinian
movement. While some would at least talk about peace with
Israel, others rejected the concept out of hand:
Rancor has erupted among leaders of the
Palestine guerrilla movement over whether to
take part in Arab-Israeli peace talks in
Geneva, even though they have not yet been
invited. ("Palestinian Guerrilla . . .," 20
Mar. 74, p. 2, c. 4.)
That the P.L.O. had only limited practical authority
over the actions of the guerrilla groups was evident:
The Palestine Liberation Organization said
yesterday that it had demanded the release of
the United States Army Colonel who was
abducted by guerrillas June 29 but that the
kidnappers had refused to free him.
. . . Colonel Morgan was in the hands of
the Popular Struggle Front and the Popular
Front — General Command, two extremist groups
among those opposed to the leadership of
Yasser Arafat. ("P.L.O. Reports . . . •, " 10
Jul. 75, p. 1, c. 4.)
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^ • Palestinia ns Are Ant i-U . S. or Pro-S ovie t
Overt Soviet assistance to the Palestinians was rare.
However, in October 1971, Arafat visited Moscow. There the
Soviet Union agreed to provide hospital care for those
guerrillas who received serious wounds in action against
Israel:
The principal stipulation was that the
guerrillas make an effort to end their
political feuding and concentrate on resuming
terrorist and sabotage attacks on Israel.
("Soviet Plan 30 Dec. 71
,
p. 1, c. 7.
)
As peace talks continued through 1974, the Palestinians
attempted to undermine the American efforts:
The Palestinian guerrilla organizations
have announced stepped up terrorist attacks
against Israeli civilian targets to sabotage
the American peace initiative that has quieted
Israel's military fronts with Egypt and Syria.
("Israel Again . . .," 20 Jun. 74, p. 2, c.
49)
A more official link between Moscow and the Palestinians
was forged when in June 1974 Arafat was invited to the
Soviet Union. This was the first trip in which Secretary




The invitation from Mr. Brezhnev, which
Mr. Arafat received last month, is interpreted
by the guerrillas as Soviet recognition of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization. ("Arafat
Off . . .," 30 Jul. 74, p. 5, c. 1.)
5 . Palestinians Are Unyielding
This theme was most dominant in 1970. As tensions rosa
in Jordan, the guerrillas were adamant in their opposition
to a peaceful settlement:
The fedayeen . . . are voicing a view long
held by Palestinian leaders when they
categorically reject the idea of a peaceful
settlement with Israel, saying it would merely
put a legal seal on the loss of their
homeland. ("Palestinians and . . .," 15 Aug.
70, p. 7, c. 1. )
The P.L.O. attempted to impose its unyielding view on
Israel's existence upon all Palestinians:
Any Palestinian supporting the idea of
creation of a Palestinian state on the
west-bank territory of Jordan will be regarded
as a traitor and tried by a Palestinian
revolutionary court, the guerrilla daily, Al
Fatah announced today. ("Backers of
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These conclusions are keyed to the objectives as they
were outlined in the introduction.
( 1 ) Determine whether the images of Arabs that are
created by_ a comp rehens ive news medium are favorable,
neutral or unfavorable
.
As was noted in Chapter IV, the aggregate results show
that a majority of the images Americans have of Arabs are
unfavorable. Over the entire period, no refsrrent had a
nigher favorable rating than it had an unfavorable rating.
If tne total image rating was quantified as the difference
between the favorable and unfavorable percentages, with the
lower the score, the more favorable the rating, then the




Image E atings for Major Referrents
fieferrent Unfavorable Favorable Score
Jordan 28.9 28.4 0.5
Saudi Arabia 26.6 21.5 5. 1
Egypt 41 .5 17.2 24.3
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Ima ge R atings for Major Referrents (cont
.
)













Iraq 65.9 11.4 54.5
Palestinians 77.8 4.9 72.9
Aggregate 51 .6 13.2 38.4
*******###************#****#***********#*********=!£*#********
(2) Determine what the favorable and unfa vora ble imag es
are.
The 24 themes that were identified provide a good deal
of insignt about how Americans see the Arabs. The
domination of the unfavorable themes (the 10 most frequent),
however, does not reflect the decline in their frequency and
the more freguent occurrence of the favoraole themes over
the course of the study. Although no attempt was made to
statistically weight the themes, it must be said that there
was a higher degree of unf avorability created when the Black
September killed the Israeli athletes in Munich than when
the royalist and republicans fought a battle in Yemen. This
becomes more important when one sees that the dominant theme
was that Arabs are or support terrorists.
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(3) Identify t rend s as the images change, and as they
§££il £° specific Arab nat ions or qroupjs of people .
The image trend has been in two parts. There has teen a
small increase in the percentage of favorable ratings (from
12.7% in 1967 to 16.8% in 1975), and a more dramatic
decrease in the unfavorable ratings (from 70.6% in 1967 to
47.4% in 1975). The war years of 1967, 1970 and 1973 are
exceptions to the trend, as is 1972, protably due to the
high level of Palestinian activity.
Two of the major national referrents made a significant
improvement in their images during the period. The turning
point for Egypt was the 1973 war. Their military
achievements, subsequent willingness to negotiate an interim
settlement in the Sinai and movement away from the Soviet
Union toward the United States were primarily responsible
for Egypt achieving more favorable than unfavorable ratings
during the 1973 through 1975 period. In Jordan, it was the
1970 war with the Palestinians that reversed its
predominantly unfavorable image. During the period 1971
through 1975, Jordan had a three-to-one favorable image
rating.
Libya was the only major referrent to shew a significant
trend towards a more unfavorable image. With the advent of
the Qaddaffi regime in September 1969, the image of Libya
took a distinct turn for the worse. Although the Libyan
image rating during the Idris period was 2-tc-1 unfavorable,
under Colonel Qaddaffi it was more than 10-tc-1 unfavorable.
Uniformly unfavorable is the best description of the
American image of Iraq. The same can also be said for the
Palestinians. Although there was an almost imperceptible
improvement in the Palestinian image rating, the terrorist
theme is so strong that it pervades not only the Palestinian
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cases but is the most frequent theme in the entire study.
One Arab state has clearly "emerged" during the period
to take a place of leadership and influence in the Arab
world. During the first six years of the study, Saudi
Arabia accounted for only twelve cases. From 1973 through
1975, however, the total was 67 cases. This emergence is
particularly interesting because the Saudis have the second
best image rating of" the major referrents. During those
first six years, there were but three unfavorable Saudi
cases. Despite the unfavorable impact the oil embargo had
on the image of Saudi Arabia, the favorable ratings also
increased during the embargo and post-emOargc period.
The trends which were evidenced in the themes were
discussed at the end of Chapter IV. A acre detailed look,
will be taken at two of the themes -- effective and
defective military. These themes occurred a total of 28 and
53 times, respectively. Such aggregate results do not,
however, tell the entire story. Throughout the study, tne
major combatants were Egypt and Syria. Although there was
virtually constant military activity of some sort, the
major, unencumbered, full-scale wars were in 1967 and 1973.
3y disaggregating the military effectiveness themes into the
variables of major combatants and the two war years, one
gets a different picture of the American image cf the
military effectiveness of Egypt and Syria. The table below









Almost immediately after fighting began in 1973,
comparisons were made between the "old" and the "new" Arab
soldier:
British military sources, . . . suggested
that the counterattack on the bridgeheads was
premature, that the Israelis . . . attacked
with insufficient forces and air preparation
against troops much improved in morale and
training from those of six years ago.
Seme qualified military sources have
suggested that . . . the Syrians have proved
tougher than expected. ("Not the Same . . .,"
10 Oct. 73, p. 19, c. 7.)
Although the Arabs were unable to translate their
initial battlefield successes into a final military victory,
the Egyptian and Syrian performance not enly altered the
military perspectives in the Middle East, but contributed




CO Be able to analyze thes e findings and draw
concl usi ons relat ive to f uture £olicy_ formulation and
analysis
In the decision-making process, the most valuable tool
would be one that reduced uncertainty ard increased the
ability of the decision-maker to predict the impact of his
decisions. The effect of a foreign policy decision made by
the United States Government is determined by two variables.
First, there is the systemic variable. Fcr instance, what
effect would a U.S. decision to recognize the Palestine
Liberation Organization as the only representative of the
Palestinian people and to deal with that organization on a
transgovernmental level, have on otner national actors? How
would the Scveit Union respond? How would the Arab world
respond? How would their responses affect U.S. interests in
the region? Statistical analysis of the data collected in
this study is of limited value in answering these kinds of
questions because the analysis did not get "into" any other
nation-states. While there were highly systematic
relationships shown between variables such as "referrent"
and "theme" or "referrent" and "category," this does not
imply any ability to predict Arab behavior since the study
dealt only with American images of Arabs. There is,
however, an increased ability to predict what the referrent
will be if one knows the theme, or category or vice versa.
(The Lambda Asymmetric measure of association, for instance,
was 0.16899 with the referrent being the dependent variable
and the theme being the independent variable. This means
that by knowing the theme one can improve his ability to
predict the referrent by 16.899%).
The second variable in determining the total impact of a
foreign policy decision is the domestic reaction. The
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pluralistic bed-rock in which the decision-making process of
the United States Government is rooted has taken on a new
dynamism of late. For better or worse, the people (usually-
through their elected representatives) have in the last
decade exercised more vigorously their role in the
decision-making process in general, with particularly acute
attention being given to U.S. foreign policy decisions.
Public support, or at least acceptance, of a governmental
decision is the legitimizing factor in the total eguation.
K.E. Boulding put it well:
The tacit support of the mass . . . is of
vital importance to the powerful. The powerful
are always under some obligation to represent
the mass, even under dictatorial regimes. In
democratic societies the aggregate influence
of the images of ordinary people is very
great; the image of the powerful cannot
diverge too greatly from the image of the mass
without the powerful losing power. 25
In most cases this legitimizing support is given as if
by default. When it is not, the bureacratic process is
affected to some small or large degree and in extreme cases
may be stopped altogether (U.S. support to anti-communist
forces in Angola, for instance) . If decision-makers could
know how the American people would react to a decision
before it was made, they would better be able to judge what
course of action to follow.
It is in this area that this study can make a
contribution to future policy formulation. Returning to the
hypothetical example of U.S. recognition of the P. L. 0.
,
one look at the Palestinian image rating would indicate that
such a decision would meet with much resistance. One should
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not assume, however, that this means that the decision could
not be implemented. What it tells the policy maker is that
he must take some measures to try to reduce or mitigate the
highly unfavorable image that Americans have of the
Palestinians. If this cannot be done, the government must
decide either not to take the action cr go ahead,
regardless, and try to ride out the domestic reaction.
Using the techniques developed in this research, the policy
maker could monitor the image for any favorable shifts. The
reader should also be reminded that there will be a
necessary time lag between the presen tation of an image and
its internal izatio n by the American public, a linkage not
explored in this research.
Another case would be a U.S. decision to sell weapons to
Egypt. In trying to determine the domestic reaction to a
concrete proposal to sell F-5's, for example, one could look
at the other Arab countries to which the U.S. has sold
weapons. Saudi Arabia and Jordan have the F-5. Their image
ratings are the most favorable of all the major national
referrents. Recall the considerable debate that occurred
prior to those sales being approved. Egypt's image rating
is much poorer than those of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Thus,
one would conclude that it would be much more difficult to
gain domestic acceptance of such a sale to Egypt. The
improvement of the American image of Egypt has been noted.
The hypothesis this presents, then, is that once continued
improvement in the Egyptian image ra-ting reaches the rating
of Saudi Arabia or Jordan, the sale of the F-5's would be
accepted by the American public and thus Congress. While
such an hypothesis cannot yet be tested, continuation of the
study and future events will provide the necessary evidence.
Unless one is willing to completely disccunt the rcle of
the masses in the decision-making process, the images that
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the people hold will affect policy. Further, the policy
makers, by knowing what these images are can better gauge
domestic reaction to a planned action or decision.
A more basic realization should also take place. As
bureaucrats and decision-makers attempt to assess the
external impact thar their foreign policy decisions will
have, a sharp awareness of what images they have of the
other international actors and how those images affect their
perception of reality will go a long way in minimizing the









) F-l effective military
) F-2 willing to negotiate
) F-3 prcgrasGiva; reforming; modernizing
) F-4 want poace; non-belligerent
) F-S united; assist each other; agroe
) F-6 pre-US; want gaed relations
) F-7 anti-texrorist/extreiaiBt
) F-8 realistic; calm; deliberate; moderate.
) F-9 care fsr heritage
) F-10 anti-cc;u:mnlst/SoviGt
) F-ll humanitarian















-4 are /support extrendsts,
terrorists 4 saboteurs;
infiltrat-re
() U-5 government; unstable, in-
capable, radical, corrupt,
repressive, extrejnipt
() U-6 unwilling to negotiate;
unyielding; uncooperative
() U-7 anti-US; prc-corrmuniat/
Soviet
() U-3 military; ineffective,
corrupt, plot against gov't,
cowardly, unreliable
( ) U-9 inhumane
() U-10 rash; short-sighted; un-
realistic; irrational
() U-ll distort truth; violate .
agreements; propagan- d sts;
exaggerate; iiaagiaati ve;
can't keep b-crets; use
threatening rhetoric
() U-12 bad character, e.g., decep-
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